New York City Council’s latest budget proposal isn’t just creative accounting—it’s a high-stakes gamble with workers’ futures dressed up as fiscal responsibility.

Buried inside the City Council’s preliminary budget response is a plan to rely on two controversial tools: re-amortization of pension debt and pension obligation bonds (POBs). Both promise short-term relief. Both come with long-term consequences.

And both are being advanced while union leadership tells members there’s nothing to worry about.

The Plan—In Their Own Words

From the Council’s proposal:

“The City could find substantial savings… that exceed $1.2 billion per year… without impacting a single pension payment.”

And further:

“The first option available is the re-amortization of the current payment schedule…”

“The second option… would be to explore the use of pension obligation bonds (POBs)… The proceeds would then be immediately deposited into the pension funds.”

On paper, it sounds painless: no benefit cuts, no layoffs—just “savings”.

But what’s being described isn’t savings—it’s a restructuring of obligations designed to ease pressure now by shifting it into the future.

All while the City Council acknowledges that there is additional risk.

Re-Amortization: Relief Today, A Longer Tail Tomorrow

Re-amortization, or pension smoothing, works much like refinancing a mortgage. Payments shrink in the short term, but the repayment timeline stretches, and total costs grow.

New York City’s pension system is already structured over long horizons — the City is presently making re-amortization back payments until 2032. Adjusting that schedule again doesn’t eliminate liabilities—it delays them further in volatile economic times. The bill doesn’t disappear; it moves further down the road, where it compounds in interest quietly.

What looks like fiscal breathing room today becomes a longer, heavier burden of taxpayer obligations tomorrow.

Pension Obligation Bonds: Borrowing on Optimism

Pension obligation bonds take that logic a step further. Instead of just reshaping payments, the City would borrow money outright, inject it into pension funds, and rely on investment returns to outperform the cost of borrowing.

The Government Finance Officers Association—a national organization representing thousands of public finance professionals that sets widely followed best practices for state and local governments—has been unequivocal in its guidance: governments should avoid POBs because they introduce significant risk and depend on market performance that cannot be guaranteed.

If the market underdelivers, the City doesn’t just fall short—it ends up carrying both the original pension burden and the added weight of bond debt. What begins as a strategy to stabilize finances can quickly become a multiplier of risk.

History offers more than theory—it offers warnings.

In Detroit, officials issued roughly $1.4 billion in pension obligation bonds just before the 2008 Financial Crisis. When markets collapsed, the strategy unraveled. Pension investments fell while bond debt remained fixed, leaving the city squeezed from both sides and contributing to its eventual bankruptcy. A similar dynamic played out in Stockton, where pension borrowing collided with a housing market crash and declining revenues, helping push the city into insolvency. In both cases, POBs didn’t create the crisis—but they amplified it at the worst possible moment.

Other governments show how the risks can build more slowly but just as dangerously. Illinois turned to pension obligation bonds in the early 2000s to ease budget pressure, yet decades later remains burdened by some of the worst-funded pensions in the country alongside ongoing debt service. In Puerto Rico, repeated reliance on borrowing to meet long-term obligations contributed to a broader debt spiral that ultimately led to default and federal oversight. The lesson across all four is consistent: borrowing against the future can create the illusion of temporary stability, but it also introduces a layer of risk that becomes most dangerous precisely when conditions deteriorate.

Warnings from Inside the System

Reporting from The Chief Leader adds an important layer often missing from official messaging: concern from those who have managed these systems themselves.

A former New York City pension director, retired NYCERS Executive Director John Murphy, warned that proposals like re-amortization may offer immediate budget relief but come at a cost—weakening long-term funding discipline and increasing the likelihood that future obligations become harder to meet. The concern isn’t theoretical; it’s operational. Stretching out payments can erode the structural integrity of the system over time.

That concern was not limited to internal administrators. Former New York City Comptroller Brad Lander (D) and former City Council Finance Committee chair Justin Brannan (D) also warned against a similar re-amortization proposal when it surfaced last year, joining a rare consensus of liberal and conservative fiscal watchdogs, policymakers, and pension experts who viewed the approach as a risky maneuver rather than a real solution.

Analysts across the political spectrum cautioned that the proposal would reduce near-term payments while increasing long-term costs—shifting liabilities forward instead of addressing them.

That same reporting situates these proposals within a broader fiscal pattern. As budget pressures mount, policymakers have increasingly looked toward long-term funds—including the Retiree Health Benefits Trust—as sources of flexibility. But these are not surplus accounts; they are commitments set aside for future retirees. Using them now introduces vulnerability later, particularly in the face of economic downturns.

What emerges is not a one-off decision, but a governing approach: managing present constraints by drawing against the future.

Pizzitola’s Warning: The Illusion of Stability

Retiree advocate and President of The Organization of New York City Public Service Retirees, Marianne Pizzitola, frames these combined strategies more bluntly, describing them as financial engineering that can create the appearance of stability without addressing underlying imbalances.

Her organization, the NYC Organization of Public Service Retirees, was among the first to expose and challenge a similar re-amortization effort last year. According to her reporting, the proposal surfaced with little public scrutiny and would have lowered near-term City contributions by extending pension costs further into the future—effectively refinancing the obligation. What followed was telling: once brought into the open, the plan faced increased resistance and scrutiny, raising questions about how such consequential changes were being advanced with limited transparency.

Her analysis suggests that re-amortization and pension borrowing don’t resolve liabilities so much as reposition them—moving costs outward while relying on favorable conditions to hold. The danger lies in how convincing that can look in the moment. Budgets appear balanced, pressure eases, and the system seems intact.

But the risk is very real. When assumptions about returns, growth, or stability don’t materialize, the burden doesn’t vanish—it reappears, often larger and more urgent. And when it does, it lands on future taxpayers, future budgets, and potentially the very workers whose benefits were said to be untouched.

Her warning is straightforward: a strategy that depends on everything going right is not protection—it is exposure.

Another Warning from Goldstein

Veteran educator, former UFT executive board member and retiree advocate, Arthur Goldstein, has drawn a direct parallel between the current proposal and past efforts to “refinance” pension obligations. In his analysis, the concept is simple but troubling: generate short-term “savings” now, then push the real cost into the future—what he characterizes as a “buy now, pay later” approach to public finance.

Goldstein, who has long written on union and retiree issues and is a potential candidate for leadership within the Retired Teachers Chapter, frames the issue less as technical policy and more as a question of trust. Workers were promised stability in exchange for years of service and concessions. Reworking how those promises are financed—especially without clear, transparent communication—raises concerns that the same pattern is repeating: immediate gains prioritized over long-term security.

A Pattern Taking Shape

Taken together, re-amortization, pension obligation bonds, and the potential use of retiree health funds reflect a disturbing consistent fiscal instinct. Immediate gaps are addressed not by reducing structural imbalance, but by extending timelines and leaning on risking future resources.

It is a strategy that can sustain itself for a time. But it is also one that accumulates pressure beneath the surface, where it is less visible and easier to defer.

The UFT’s Silence—and Its Contradiction

Against this backdrop, the United Federation of Teachers has told members that claims the City is using pensions to balance the budget are a “myth.”

To reinforce that message, union leadership has paraded voices like TRS Chair Tom Brown, who has publicly dismissed concerns as “misinformation” while offering no position, nor educating members about the proposal.

At the same time, others within the pension governance space are telling a very different story. David Kazansky, a nine-year former trustee and current TRS candidate, has been actively working to inform members about the details contained in the City Council’s proposal—pointing directly to the use of re-amortization and pension obligation bonds as mechanisms tied to budget savings.

Concerns are not limited to retirees or outside advocates. Rank-and-file leadership has begun speaking out as well. Brooklyn D75 chapter leader Chad Hamilton put it this way:

“When Mulgrew’s TRS trustee candidate, Tom Brown, says politicians cannot take money from our pension fund, that is technically correct.

However, while politicians cannot take money out, they can absolutely reduce and delay the money going in. This has had disastrous results and contributed significantly to eventual financial insolvency in other U.S. cities and Puerto Rico.

Our union should be having an open dialogue about this important issue. Instead this issue will get a quick and casual mention by Mulgrew at the monthly, Unity-controlled and anti-democratic UFT Delegate Assembly.

Mulgrew will tell us without explanation that anyone with questions or concerns about this plan is a liar and a hater of the union, and then he will move on to the next topic. Many of the Unity caucus sycophants in the audience will clap and cheer, without even knowing what they’re clapping for.

This is the bizarre and disturbing state of our union.”

At the same time, the union is pushing to “fix Tier 6,” advocating for expanded pension benefits that would increase long-term system costs.

The tension between these positions is difficult to ignore. Members are being reassured that pensions are not part of the City’s budget balancing strategy, even as official documents outline over a billion dollars in annual savings tied to pension financing changes—and internal voices raise concerns about what that actually means.

What’s missing is a clear, transparent explanation that reconciles these competing narratives.

The Real Question: Who Carries the Risk?

City officials maintain that these proposals do not affect current retirees or workers. That may be true in the immediate sense.

But it rests on a chain of assumptions: that markets perform as expected, that revenues stabilize, and that future leaders can absorb the deferred costs without consequence.

If those assumptions hold, the strategy works.

“It’s a Myth”? The Record—and the Contradiction—Say Otherwise

The UFT has reassured members that claims the City is using pensions to balance the budget are a “myth.”

But the City Council’s own proposal states:

“The City could find substantial savings… that exceed $1.2 billion per year…”

“The first option available is the re-amortization…”

“The second option… would be to explore the use of pension obligation bonds…”

That is the City explicitly identifying pension financing changes as a source of budget savings, which in turn are used to help balance the budget.

So the message to members becomes contradictory:

And when that framing collides with policies that expand costs while obscuring how they’re managed, it raises a more serious question:

Who is being told the full story—and who isn’t?

Related:

Marianne Pizzitola

Pension Ponzi Scheme 2.0 - City Style

Last March you might recall that we held a campaign against the “Pension Ponzi Scheme” where the UFT TRS Pension Board Member Tom Brown insisted they could be trusted and would not do anything to jeopardize the pension. I am sure he believed that, or at least as a paid employee of the UFT, was told to say it more likely - but the issue remains that ev…

Read more

11 days ago · 19 likes · 1 comment · Marianne Pizzitola

Union Matters

The City, Once Again, Wants to Refinance Pensions

It appears our friends in the City Council are not averse to taking risks with pension funding. Unlike Mayor Mamdani, Council Speaker Julie Menin doesn’t want to tax the rich. After all, rich people are fragile, and if you touch them, they may just break…

Read more

9 days ago · 20 likes · 12 comments · Arthur Goldstein

Ever Upward

NYC pension gimmick alert: it's baackk

A proposal to generate short-term budget savings by pushing unfunded city pension pension obligations into the future—wisely (if wordlessly) abandoned by Governor Hochul just a year ago—has resurfaced in the New York City Council’s response to Mayor Mamdani’s preliminary budget…

Read more

15 days ago · 4 likes · 1 comment · E.J. McMahon

Ever Upward

Assembly backs NYC pension gimmick in state budget

After popping out of the blue into Governor Kathy Hochul’s state budget amendments a few weeks ago, a proposed stretching-out of New York City’s pension funding schedule moved at least a half step closer to reality in Albany last week. Although it was among the Hochul provisions “intentionally omitted” from Senate Democrats’ amended one-house budget bil…

Read more

a year ago · 6 likes · 3 comments · E.J. McMahon

Share

This week, the United Federation of Teachers revived its legislative push to deliver a $10,000 annual payment to New York City paraprofessionals. Branded as a “RESPECT Check,” the proposal is being framed as long overdue relief for a workforce that earns barely above $31,000 at entry level in one of the most expensive cities in America.

No one serious disputes the crisis. Paraprofessional shortages are real. Turnover is high. Many paras work second jobs to survive. Students with disabilities rely on them daily. Retention is not a theoretical workforce metric — it is a structural vulnerability in the school system.

And the shortage centers around the reality that paras need a living wage.

Two years ago, a dissident slate of rank and file paras, called Fix Para Pay, won the paraprofessional chapter election by a 75% margin by drumbeating this very message.

Fix Para Pay’s success worried the union leadership Unity-UFT caucus so much that they decided that proposing a para “Respect Check” bill in the middle of the 2025 general union officer elections would help them curry favor with paras once again.

But once you move beyond the Respect Check branding, caucus politics, electioneering and read Intro 0692-2026 carefully, a more complicated story emerges.

Is this relief now, respect later?

Or is relief being positioned as a substitute for respect?

What the New Bill Actually Creates

Intro 0692-2026 establishes what it explicitly defines as a “non-pensionable lump sum payment of $10,000” per year for eligible paraprofessionals. The payment is to be issued no later than August 1 following the school year. It does not amend the DOE salary schedule. It does not increase base pay. It does not alter longevity steps. It does not count toward retirement calculations.

The bill calls these payments “workforce stabilization.”

And it calls them temporary.

The statute states that once the city signs a collective bargaining agreement providing an increase in “total annual compensation” equal to or greater than the stabilization payments, the law is deemed repealed.

Not phased out.

Repealed.

The title itself includes the phrase “providing for the repeal thereof.” The exit ramp is written directly into the structure.

But a bigger fact remains. Even if this is passed into law, it could be repealed at any moment at the whims of political actors in City Council and City Hall.

The union calls this respect.

The bill calls it stabilization.

Stabilization is an emergency tool — not structural permanence.

A Hard Pivot From Last Year

The contrast with last year’s proposal is impossible to ignore.

Intro 1261-2025 — sponsored by Keith Powers and backed by 47 Council co-sponsors — was framed as a structural correction, a “para pay index” tied to the widening gap between paraprofessional starting salaries and the highest principal salaries. The union publicly described it as fluctuating above a $10,000 floor, with projected growth over time. Reporting at the time suggested it could begin around $10,800 and rise toward $12,000 in later years.

That earlier model was not pensionable either. It was not collectively bargained. But it was presented as dynamic — responsive to widening inequities rather than frozen at a flat number.

This year’s bill drops the index entirely. There is no principal linkage. No escalator. No formula responding to differential growth. What remains is a fixed $10,000 payment framed as temporary stabilization.

If last year’s pitch was “we fix the gap,” this year’s version is “we issue a relief check.”

That is not a cosmetic change. It is a strategic downgrade. And none of this has been explained to members.

The $450 Million ‘Epic Fail’ Moment

This is not the first time paraprofessional wages were at a crossroads.

During the 2023 contract cycle under Michael Mulgrew and the dominant Unity Caucus, approximately $450 million in non-pensionable retention funds existed within the contract framework. Those funds were distributed broadly across titles as retention bonuses rather than targeted toward restructuring paraprofessional base pay.

Nearly half a billion dollars represented rare fiscal flexibility. Instead of using that moment to permanently lift the lowest-paid title in the system, leadership chose equal distribution across the membership.

The result was short-term relief — but no structural shift in para salary schedules, no pensionable correction, and no narrowing of long-term pay gaps.

In a union that touts and teaches equity – helping those most vulnerable and in need – it failed to practice it.

That was not an inevitability. It was a policy decision.

Now leadership argues legislation is the only path to immediate relief. Members remember the earlier forks in the road.

The Internal Fight Before This Bill

The strategic pivot toward legislation did not happen quietly.

A member-driven resolution called for a comprehensive collective bargaining plan to win a living wage for paraprofessionals — complete with timelines and measurable objectives. It would have required the union to map out escalation before the next contract.

Instead, the key language was stripped.

At Executive Board and Delegate Assembly meetings, the Unity-aligned para chapter leader, Priscilla Castro, argued against tying the union’s hands at the bargaining table. Rather than centering living wages, discussion shifted toward professional development, CTLE credits, and procedural items. Earlier remarks by Castro at the UFT executive board suggesting that NYC paraprofessionals were “better off” than those in other states reinforced the perception that expectations were being managed downward rather than lifted.

The binding elements of the bargaining plan were removed from the resolution. The legislative strategy advanced.

A year later, a plan was devised by the leadership’s “three men in a room” to use our union’s COPE dollars in a local legislative fix for para pay while never consulting paraprofessionals on exploring a range of solutions.

The shift placed compensation reform in City Hall rather than at the negotiating table.

It compensates and relies heavily on lobbyists rather than engage in the work of grassroots planning and organizing with paras.

The Political Optics: Mulgrew, Menin, and the Money

For this bill to pass this time around, they will need a cooperative City Council speaker.

The proximity between Michael Mulgrew and City Council Speaker Julie Menin is not merely rhetorical. It’s closer than we may think.

They say politics creates “strange bedfellows” and, no doubt, the UFT leadership has definitely been courting Menin.

Campaign finance disclosures show that “United For NYC’s Future (2025),” an independent expenditure entity connected to UFT leadership, reported $1.75 million in total contributions and $1.65 million in spending. Of that total, $210,219 was spent in support of Menin’s City Council campaign.

That figure represents independent expenditure support — not a direct payment to Menin — but it places her among the most heavily supported candidates in that filing. Second only to our union’s COPE monies given to former UFT political operative Dermott Smyth’s failed city council run.

That the UFT spent that amount of money when Menin did not face any stiff competition and won her race handily, says something.

Now she is publicly branded by the union as the “Champion of the Paraprofessional RESPECT Check.” She is headlining this year’s UFT para awards luncheon.

More importantly, she presides as Speaker over the revived legislation.

Last year’s indexed bill died because then-Speaker Adrienne Adams blocked it at the end of session. Leadership determines what moves.

This time, the Speaker who received over $210,000 in independent expenditure support from a UFT-aligned entity is overseeing the revived effort.

That does not prove causation.

But it establishes political alignment.

And alignment matters when a bill estimated to cost roughly $260 million annually moves through a Council facing a projected $7 billion budget gap and active discussions about reserve withdrawals.

But honeymoons are short lived. Things can change quickly when the bills start rolling in. And finding close to $300 million a year to pay for this para bill at a time when the city faces a budget crisis may ruin the mood of City Hall and the Menin-Mulgrew relationship.

Other Unions Are Watching — And So Are School Aides, Cafeteria Workers, & EMTs

The ripple effects extend beyond paraprofessionals.

Other union leaders are not happy with this bill as written. Mulgrew has told members as much.

DC 37, which represents low-paid school aides and cafeteria workers, has signaled concern about precedent. A legislative supplement for one title outside collective bargaining disrupts the coordinated framework inside the Municipal Labor Committee.

And the parity pressure is not theoretical.

EMT workers are currently asking the City Council for pay parity with their fellow FDNY colleagues. They argue they perform emergency response work alongside firefighters, operate in the same high-risk conditions, yet are paid significantly less under separate union structures.

If City Council becomes a venue for targeted wage correction, pattern bargaining begins to fracture. Every low-paid title — aides, cafeteria workers, clerical staff, EMTs — will have a legislative blueprint.

This bill is not just a para bill.

It is a precedent.

The Fiscal Headwinds

Even if the moral case is compelling, the fiscal climate is unforgiving.

Mayor Zohran Mamdani has outlined budget gaps estimated around $7 billion, with public discussion of drawing from the Rainy Day Fund and the Retiree Health Benefits Trust to stabilize finances.

Based on the mayor’s public budget outline reported earlier this year, the proposed reserve drawdowns to help cover the deficit were:

• $980 million from the Rainy Day Fund

• $229 million from the Retiree Health Benefits Trust

That totals $1.209 billion proposed from reserve funds to cover the budget shortfalls this fiscal year.

As it stands, the preliminary budget leaves out funding for several previously supported school programs, including restorative justice initiatives, expanded mental health services, and certain student support programs such as social workers and internship pathways. Without restoration in the final budget, schools could lose critical wraparound services that support vulnerable students, school climate, and dropout prevention efforts.

Other programs and services citywide will see cuts or elimination while increases to homeowner’s property taxes are also being proposed.

Meanwhile, estimates place the para bill stabilization payments at roughly $260 to $300 million annually.

The union’s FAQ argues the money would come from the City’s general funds and notes that the city previously “found” billions in additional resources. That argument may have sounded persuasive in a surplus cycle.

In the deficit cycle we are currently in, defined by reserve withdrawals and austerity planning based on a $7 billion budget gap, it sounds very unrealistic.

Contractual raises are binding obligations.

Legislative supplements are political and economic line items.

That distinction matters when budgets tighten.

The Pledge Campaign: Commitment — To What?

Alongside the revived bill, UFT leadership, to their credit, has rolled out a coordinated push bringing paraprofessionals face to face with City Council members. Social media posts celebrate “pledges of support” secured borough by borough. The optics are strong: paras in union gear, council members smiling, pledge cards in hand.

But what are they actually signing?

The certificate reads “Para Respect Check Pledge” and includes four commitments:

• Support Fair Pay for Paraprofessionals

• Ensure Quality Training & Development

• Advocate for Better Benefits

• Respect & Value Paraprofessionals

At the bottom: “I stand with our paraprofessionals!”

It is politically airtight. No council member is going to oppose “fair pay.” No one is against “respect.” In a city where paraprofessionals start at barely $31,000, support for fairness is the easiest vote in the room.

But the pledge does not reference the para bill, Intro 0692-2026.

It does not mention a $10,000 non-pensionable stabilization payment.

It does not commit to approving a roughly $260-300 million recurring expense.

It does not bind anyone to vote yes in the middle of a projected $7 billion budget gap.

The language is intentionally aspirational and ambiguous, not legislative.

There is a difference between signing a values statement and voting for a specific fiscal obligation. Council members represent districts with competing demands — housing, sanitation, youth services, public safety — all within a tightening budget.

So when the union announces “commitments secured,” the real question is not whether council members support fair pay in principle.

The question is whether they are prepared to fund this bill, at this cost, under these fiscal conditions.

Those are not the same commitment.

Relief Now — But What About Respect?

Nobody serious denies paraprofessionals need immediate relief. Even critics acknowledge that $10,000 would ease real burdens in this affordability crisis we are facing.

But an investigative reading of this legislation shows something else is real:

This is not the structural solution that was sold last year.

Last year’s model was pitched as a para pay index tied to widening principal differentials, designed to rise above a $10,000 floor.

This year’s model is a fixed $10,000 payment labeled temporary, explicitly non-pensionable, and written into law as something that will repeal itself once certain compensation thresholds are met.

Add the earlier $450 million contract decision. Add the dilution of a bargaining roadmap. Add the political alignment. Add the fiscal uncertainty and precedent implications.

Add that none of this is guaranteed.

A pattern emerges.

Relief is promised.

Union power is deferred.

The union leadership can call that respect.

But the bill calls it stabilization.

And stabilization is not permanence.

The real question is not whether paraprofessionals deserve $10,000 more.

It is whether stabilization becomes the ceiling — or whether respect still means structural, pensionable, collectively bargained pay.

The Bottom Line: Mulgrew and his Unity caucus, time and time again have DISRESPECTFULLY failed for decades to deliver a living wage for paraprofessionals —only delivering more and more excuses and empty promises.

And kicking the can down the road again is not RESPECT, either.

Vamos a ver.

Tonight at 7 PM on WBAI 99.5 FM, Talk Out of School features Part 1 of a two-part interview with longtime NYC educator, unionist, and former three-term TRS Trustee David Kazansky.

In this series, we will dig into:

• David’s storied career as an educator, unionist and trustee

• What really happens inside the TRS boardroom

• Private equity and pension transparency

• Fiduciary duty and divestment

• Tier 6 and what reform would actually take

• The upcoming TRS trustee election — and what’s at stake

This is a substantive, no-spin conversation about retirement security for NYC educators and retirees.

📻 Tune in tonight at 7 PM EST on WBAI 99.5 FM

Or stream it live at wbai.org

We will post the podcast here after the show.

Part 2 also drops here next week and will be aired the next time Daniel hosts Talk Out of School.

Let’s stay informed.

— Dan Alicea

Learn more about David at WeTrustDavid.org

February break is here. Whether you’re on beach somewhere, on your couch, or just catching your breath — this is the moment to plug in.

There are major decisions happening right now about retirement benefits and pension, prescription coverage, and the future of UFT active workers and retirees.

Staying informed isn’t optional anymore.

📢 JOIN TODAY’S LIVE CALL WITH DAVID KAZANSKY

A Beginner’s Guide to the New TRS Roth TDA

The TRS Roth TDA option is now available, and many members still have questions about how it works and whether it makes sense.

This session will cover:

• How the TRS Roth TDA works

• Traditional vs. Roth contributions

• Taxes now vs. later

• What changes (and what doesn’t)

• What to consider before adjusting contributions

Clear information. Practical explanations. No spin.

📅 Tuesday, February 17

🕒 5PM

🔗 Register here: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/xSNwkxWhQHSbZqjlyrup1g

Use a little of your break to make sure you understand your retirement savings options. Share this link with others too!

🔥 STAY CONNECTED WITH DAVID KAZANSKY

Follow David Kazansky for updates and analysis. He’s running for NYC TRS trustee in the upcoming spring election.

Follow at:

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61586074705494

Instagram: http://instagram.com/davidkaznyc

🌐 http://wetrustdavid.org

✍️ BEFORE YOU LOG OFF — SIGN THE PETITION

Stop Charging Retirees. NEARLY 5500 HAVE SIGNED ALREADY!

This petition is about one clear issue:

UFT retirees are paying significant prescription drug premiums — while the UFT Welfare Fund holds over $1 billion in reserves.

Here are the numbers:

• UFT retirees pay up to $180 per month (individuals)

• Families pay up to $340 per month

• That equals up to $1,260 per year for individuals

• And up to $3,420 per year for families

Even with a possible reimbursement from the City (up to $900 for individuals only), retirees are still paying substantial annual costs in the thousands.

Meanwhile, several other major NYC unions provide premium-free prescription coverage to their retirees.

The petition calls on the UFT to:

Use its welfare fund reserves to subsidize or eliminate retiree prescription premiums — just like other unions do.

Just use existing reserves to stop charging retirees thousands per year.

👉 Sign here:

http://stopchargingretirees.org

Rest. Recharge.

But don’t disengage.

Protect your retirement. Learn more about your pension options.

Protect retiree prescription coverage.

Sign. Show up. Stay informed.

This is no longer a quiet disagreement inside the Municipal Labor Committee. It is a war over who controls its direction—and it has names.

On one side is Henry Garrido, leading District Council 37.

On the other is Michael Mulgrew, president of the United Federation of Teachers.

For years, they moved together. Now they don’t. And because DC 37 and UFT are the two largest unions in the MLC, they also carry the heaviest weighted votes. When aligned, that combined weight has historically been enough to carry decisions and impose direction.

But MLC governance requires a two-thirds majority. And that is where the rupture matters.

With DC 37 and UFT now at odds, neither side can reach the supermajority threshold on its own. Even together, their votes are no longer sufficient without pulling in a critical bloc of smaller unions. The result is paralysis: no easy consensus, no uncontested leadership, and no clear path forward on health policy.

That is not dysfunction. This is a power struggle made structural.

The Breaking Point: When the Cushion Disappeared

For decades, the Health Insurance Stabilization Fund functioned as the MLC’s shock absorber. It covered gaps between projected and actual health-care costs, allowing leadership to promise “savings” without immediately confronting whether those savings were real.

That illusion collapsed when former Comptroller Brad Lander audited the fund and revealed his findings before leaving office in December.

As reported by The City, the audit found that the Stabilization Fund is now entirely insolvent, while billions in long-term liabilities were never clearly disclosed.

Instead of being used solely to stabilize health costs, the fund was repeatedly tapped to plug unrelated budget holes—masking the true cost of labor agreements year after year.

The audit further found:

• Basic financial controls were missing

• Unpaid liabilities: ≈ $3.1 BILLION

• Total taken from HISF overall (City + welfare funds): ≈ $4.3 BILLION

  • To City: ≈ $2.8B

  • To Welfare funds: ≈ $1.5B (lump sum) + ≈ $0.69B (recurring)

• Bulk transfers from the HISF went to the city and the union welfare funds

• Claimed “savings” were often achieved by spending down reserves, not by reducing underlying health-care costs

Once the cushion vanished, there was no buffer left. No room to hide bad assumptions. No way to avoid assigning responsibility.

From that point forward, the central question inside the MLC became unavoidable: who decides direction when the money is gone?

The Minutes Tell the Story

The clearest evidence of the shift is in the most recent DC 37 executive council minutes that have been leaked to The Wire. They read like a union drawing a line.

On welfare fund data, the minutes state plainly:

“MLC members will share Welfare Fund data. DC 37 will do it only after we ensure data is made anonymous.”

That language reflects DC 37’s concern, not any assurance made by insurers.

The same minutes tie Garrido’s posture to a broader warning:

“Executive Director Garrido is concerned with the MLC’s finances, direction, and equity for all members.”

This is not about who “owns” the data.

It is about governance after the MLC’s recent failures.

Lastly, the DC 37 minutes also record a rare break from custom, after two attempts to vote for the next MLC chair resulted in deadlock:

“In the latest vote, neither candidate received the requisite two-thirds vote for MLC Chair. Executive Director Garrido will continue to run and will request a debate with the other candidate.”

In an organization where leadership is typically settled through quiet consensus among the largest unions, calling for a debate signals a refusal to let direction be decided behind among just a few behind closed doors. With DC 37 and UFT holding the heaviest weighted votes but now split, no candidate can reach the two-thirds threshold without persuading smaller unions. A debate forces that reckoning into the open—and makes control of the MLC an explicit, contested question rather than a foregone conclusion.

The Friday the 13th Meeting — Risk Scores, Demographics, and What Was Not Said

That tension hardened at a Friday the 13th MLC meeting convened specifically to discuss plans to share unions’ Welfare Fund data with the City’s insurers, led by UnitedHealthcare and its third-party claims administrator UMR.

If Henry Garrido and DC 37 leadership were concerned about whether data could be considered “anonymous,” that concern was not allayed by the presenters.

There was no representation by UnitedHealthcare or UMR that the data would be anonymized.

Instead, it was made clear—explicitly and implicitly—that member-level and dependent-level data would be used, with each individual assigned a risk score based on specific data tied to real people. Those scores would feed utilization models used to manage care, evaluate claims, fuel delays and denials and shape future cost projections.

That is when Garrido pressed on demographics.

Not as a technical aside, but because demographics are the backbone of risk scoring: age, family composition, medical history, prescription use, and patterns of care. Once those variables are in play, the consequences are predictable.

His concerns are well-founded.

Age alone can drive a risk score. Disability status and pre-existing conditions can too. And race and ethnicity often enter predictive models indirectly—through historical utilization patterns shaped by unequal access to care, systemic bias, and disparities in diagnosis and treatment.

When race, age, or disability function as proxies for cost risk, tiered scoring risks hard-coding existing inequities into benefit administration—raising serious questions about fairness and discrimination, even if no one says those words out loud.

Risk scores do not sit idle. They drive utilization management, inform claims review and power systems that determine:

• what gets approved

• what gets delayed

• what gets denied

• and which populations are flagged as “high cost”

Garrido’s skepticism was not ideological. Acting as an interim chair, he was forcing the MLC to confront the reality of what was being approved—without assurances, and with real downstream consequences for members and their families.

That exchange explains why the DC 37 minutes read the way they do. The caution recorded there flowed directly from a meeting where member-specific and dependent-specific data would be used to automate decisions, while unions would later be judged on whether “savings” appeared.

Why Mulgrew Can’t Run For MLC Chair—and Needs a Proxy

Mulgrew still wants the MLC moving fast, tightly aligned with City Hall, and resistant to internal dissent. But he cannot run for chair himself.

His standing across the coalition has been badly damaged—by unilateral decisions, by the fallout from Medicare Advantage, and by what the stabilization fund collapse exposed.

Frankly, he’s highly unpopular among local union leaders.

So UFT needs a stand-in.

That is why it backs Greg Floyd of Teamsters Local 237. Floyd is not the story. He is the vehicle—allowing Mulgrew to shape direction without putting his own name on the ballot.

Where Medicare Advantage Fits—and Where It Doesn’t

Medicare Advantage did not cause this rupture.

It exposed it.

MA was approved under the assumption that the stabilization fund would absorb the risk. When that assumption failed, MA collapsed into lawsuits, injunctions, and political retreat under former mayor Eric Adams.

For DC 37, it became proof that speed without scrutiny produces outcomes unions cannot defend.

History Isn’t a Metaphor—It’s Memory

DC 37 has lived this fight before.

In the early 1970s, Albert Shanker refused to join a DC 37–led MLC under Victor Gotbaum, choosing instead to battle the mayor directly. The dispute escalated when UFT moved to organize DC 37–represented school aides—an effort many viewed as poaching.

The dispute grew so serious that the AFL-CIO intervened, ruled that UFT had violated its anti-raiding provisions, and ordered it to cease.

The lesson stuck: when roles shift and power is unsettled, representation fights follow.

Why Parent Coordinators Matter Now

That history explains why today’s signals are taken seriously.

Since Mayor Mamdani announced changes to the parent coordinator role as part of his agenda to reform mayoral accountability and increase family involvement in our public schools, some DC 37 parent coordinators say they are being quietly encouraged to consider joining UFT. Nothing formal. No announcement. Just conversations.

Parent coordinators are DC 37 members, embedded in schools, and now facing a role redefinition—similar conditions that existed in the 1970s.

For DC 37, that talk is not rumor. It is a warning.

What Comes Next: The War Spreads

Every fight that follows—the PICA PBM RFP, the blame over missed health-care savings, and the race to negotiate first—traces back to the same fact laid bare by Brad Lander’s audit: the stabilization fund was spent down to mask costs, not control them, and once that cushion vanished, the question of who sets direction—and who owns failure—could no longer be avoided.

Healthcare Savings—and Who Gets Blamed

An RFP for a new PBM to handle PICA drugs is coming. If projected savings fall short again, the fight will not be technical. It will be political: which union signed off, and which union warned against it.

Also, there are internal reports that an RFP is in process to renegotiate the city’s Medicare supplemental SeniorCare insurance, this year also.

After Medicare Advantage and the fund collapse, no one wants to be left holding the bag twice.

The Para Check Was a Preview

The failed $10,000 paraprofessional bonus differential check exposed growing fault lines. Other unions, led by DC-37, with lower-paid members balked at giving only one title a substantial differential, and those objections were made known to City Council leadership.

It is a major reason why it did not pass even with a supermajority of council members claiming to support it. None of them would act decisively because of the fractures it would cause.

Labor unity fractured—not against City Hall, but internally.

Who Negotiates First in Next Contract Round —and Sets the Pattern

Both DC 37 and UFT have contracts expiring next year. The fight over who negotiates first—and who sets the pattern—has already begun.

Mulgrew signaled he wants UFT first at the table at the last UFT delegate assembly. But that strategy collides with a commitment by UFT’s parent union, the American Federation of Teachers, to align contract expirations to May 1, 2028.

The AFT commitment to May 1, 2028 reflects language in its resolution explicitly endorsing the UAW’s call to align contract expirations on International Workers’ Day as a way to build toward mass, coordinated national labor action — including the possibility of a general strike — by ensuring unions are not fragmented by staggered contract timelines.

That constraint and pledge complicates things but many don’t think Mulgrew cares.

Mulgrew moved first, in 2014, when De Blasio was elected and took office after years of city unions being without a contract under Bloomberg. It was in 2014 that he made his ill-fated deal for retroactive raises, by dipping into the Stabilization fund for wages, and laid down the groundwork for the slew of healthcare savings givebacks since then. And with newly elected Mayor Mamdani, he has a key player in that 2014 deal — First Deputy Mayor, Dean Fuleihan.

The Bottom Line

This is not a dispute over data. It is not a Medicare Advantage post-mortem.

It is a struggle over who governs the MLC after the money ran out and who the city will hold accountable at the bargaining table because of the failures to achieve “cost savings”.

Garrido is betting that scrutiny, debate, and accountability are unavoidable.

Mulgrew is betting he can still move fast and first.

The minutes show the split. The audit explains the stakes.

Two power brokers have collided.

And the next round of decisions will decide who actually controls the future of the MLC.

Also read:

“So… Are We Being Held Hostage?”

The question didn’t come from a script. It came from the tension in the virtual meeting room.

The informational meeting itself was convened because the City and its health care partners want the over 100 city union locals that comprise the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC) to share their welfare fund prescription drug data to support additional projected savings of the new NYC Employees PPO.

As revealed by leaked audio obtained by The Wire, the discussion quickly moved beyond technical questions into how participation shortfalls would be handled if unions refused.

After nearly an hour of discussion about projected savings, participation thresholds, prescription drug data, and repeated reassurances that everything being proposed was “normal,” a union leader finally asked what many people had been thinking:

“So… are we being held hostage?”

It wasn’t a provocation. It was an attempt to understand the leverage at play.

If unions don’t agree to share prescription drug data, what actually happens next? Does the issue simply go away? Or does it come back later—during contract talks, benefit negotiations, or arbitration?

The answer mattered. And the response that followed clarified the real pressure point.

MLC leadership explained that if the projected savings tied to the new health care plan are not achieved, the City carries that gap forward. It doesn’t disappear. It becomes part of the City’s argument in future labor negotiations—used to justify demands for benefit changes, cost shifting, or concessions in the next round of bargaining.

The discussion made clear that failing to meet the plan’s savings assumptions would not simply be absorbed by the City. As captured in the meeting audio, those gaps would be carried forward and used in future negotiations—and potentially pending arbitrations—as evidence that unions did not deliver on health care cost containment.

No one said unions would be punished for saying no. But everyone understood the implication.

That was the moment the meeting stopped being an information session and became something else entirely.

What That Question Changed

Up to that point, the discussion had been framed as technical and optional. Data sharing was described as voluntary. Participation targets were presented as goals. Savings were discussed as estimates.

Once it became clear that unmet savings would be banked and leveraged later, everything else had to be understood differently.

From that moment on, the meeting wasn’t really about whether prescription drug data should be shared. It was about whether unions realistically had the freedom to refuse—or whether saying no today simply meant paying a higher price tomorrow.

The $100 Million Hanging Over the Room

The discussion kept circling back to the same figure: roughly $100 million in projected savings tied to the NYC Employees PPO.

Leadership framed these savings as necessary to stabilize health care costs and preserve benefits. But what became clear is that the savings are not guaranteed. They depend on participation—specifically, whether enough unions agree to share prescription drug data.

Roughly 75 percent participation was cited repeatedly. Hit that number, and the plan works as designed. Miss it, and the savings gap doesn’t vanish—it becomes future leverage for the City.

This was not a neutral discussion about data governance. It was a conversation conducted under the shadow of upcoming contract negotiations.

When “Data Sharing” Became a Concrete Demand

As the meeting continued, unions began asking basic questions: how would the data be shared? Who would receive it? What additional costs will Welfare Funds bear in this data transfer? How often?

The answers were delivered calmly and antiseptically.

Prescription drug data would flow directly from union PBMs to the carrier. It would be sent weekly. This was described as standard practice.

But weekly prescription data is not routine. It is a detailed, constantly updated record of what medications people take, what conditions they are treated for, and how their care changes over time. It allows future costs to be anticipated and managed before they ever show up in claims.

Importantly, this data does not relate only to union members themselves. It includes their spouses, children, and other covered dependents, sweeping entire families into the same AI-driven analytic and scoring systems.

When the Real Value of the Data Slipped Out

At one point, almost in passing, an MLC leader referenced the prescription drug data itself as being worth around $500 million.

There was no valuation process behind that number. No bidding. No negotiation. The $100 million figure discussed throughout the meeting was not payment for the data—it was an estimate of how much money could be saved by using it.

That distinction matters.

It means unions are not being compensated for a valuable asset created by members’ and dependents’ lives, illnesses, treatment histories and other related personal information. They are being asked to give it up so the City and its insurer can strengthen their hand in future negotiations.

Tiered Risk Scores — What Really Happens When You’re Labeled “High Risk” by AI

When the meeting turned to risk scoring, the structure became clearer—and more troubling.

Members would be sorted into three tiers — low, mid, high — with each tier determining how closely their care would be monitored and managed. While presenters framed this as a way to “prioritize outreach,” the effect is obvious: the sickest, most vulnerable people are flagged first, watched most closely, and subjected to the most intervention.

In a system designed to generate savings, that intervention does not mean more generous care. It means more scrutiny.

By definition, tiered risk scoring concentrates attention on older members, people with chronic illnesses, disabled members, and those requiring ongoing medication or specialty care—the very populations most likely to generate higher costs.

What stood out was not what was said, but what wasn’t.

When Henry Garrido, President of DC 37, asked directly whether demographic factors such as age, gender, race, or ethnicity were incorporated into the risk models, the question went unanswered. Presenters fumbled and spoke generally about algorithms, while they avoided confirming what variables were actually used, how they were weighted, or how bias would be meaningfully mitigated.

They simply answered that they have a “nationally recognized” committee that ensures there’s no bias. The name of the committee was not shared, nor their methodology, nor who funds it.

That silence matters. Age alone can drive a risk score. Disability status and pre-existing conditions can too. And race and ethnicity often enter predictive models indirectly—through historical utilization patterns shaped by unequal access to care, systemic bias, and disparities in diagnosis and treatment.

When race, age, or disability function as proxies for cost risk, tiered scoring risks hard-coding existing inequities into benefit administration—raising serious questions about fairness and discrimination, even if no one says those words out loud.

In practice, tiered scoring does not sort members by who needs help. It sorts them by who is expected to cost money. Once a member lands in a higher tier, prior authorizations increase, step therapy becomes more common, and approvals take longer. This alone dispels the talking points that there’s no bias in this AI predictive model.

For elderly, disabled, chronically ill members—and communities already facing barriers to care—that friction is not incidental. It is inherent and structural.

Why “Care Management” Usually Means Denials and Delays

Throughout the meeting, leadership described the plan as “care management” designed to reduce redundancy and “holistically” help patients get healthier.

In a self-funded plan, redundancy means utilization. And reducing utilization is how savings are created.

Once prescription data and risk scores are in place, care doesn’t get coordinated so much as filtered. Tests require preauthorization. Medications trigger step therapy. Procedures slow down under review. Scores are inextricably tied to denials.

Friction is intentionally caused by United Healthcare’s subsidiary, United Medical Resources (UMR).

When we talk about friction, we are not talking about thoughtful oversight or better coordination. Friction is the accumulation of small obstacles that make care harder to get: extra paperwork, repeated phone calls, new forms, longer waits, and constant justifications for care that was once routine. For people who are sick, elderly, disabled, or already marginalized, friction is often the difference between timely care, life-saving procedures and worsening health.

“Financial Navigation” Is Cost Control by Another Name

When UHC presenters talked about “financial navigation,” they framed it as help.

In reality, it is about steering care based on price, not simply medical need.

It inserts the insurer into decisions that used to be between a patient and a doctor—questioning prescriptions, pushing substitutions, delaying needed treatments and procedures, and nudging members toward cheaper paths.

Called help, it functions as control over care — motivated by profits.

“We’re Only Here to Help”

Throughout the meeting, UHC and UMR presenters repeatedly cast themselves as neutral helpers.

But let’s be honest, UnitedHealthcare is not a benevolent, altruistic partner; it is the largest for-profit health insurer in the country, widely criticized for leading the industry in denials, delays, and aggressive utilization management. UMR applies that same model inside self-funded plans like New York City’s.

The data’s value comes from control.

“The Welfare Fund Owns the Data.” Does It?

Presenters reassured unions that welfare funds would “own” the data.

Ownership on paper is not control in practice. Once prescription-level data is transferred weekly, integrated into analytics, and used to train models, it cannot be meaningfully clawed back. The insights learned belong to the insurer and train its systems.

The Change Healthcare Breach — and Why It Matters

UnitedHealth Group’s tech subsidiary Change Healthcare suffered the largest health data breach in U.S. history, exposing over 192 million Americans.

This matters. The same corporate ecosystem now seeking weekly prescription-level data has already shown it cannot guarantee security at scale.

And this is the same United Healthcare that leads the industry in claim denials.

Once shared with UHC, data cannot be unshared.

A Seat at the Table — and a Position Already Taken

Legal counsel for the UFT Welfare Fund was present during the Friday discussion. As was UFT Welfare Fund Director, Geof Sorkin, who expressed enthusiastic support for moving forward with the data transfers saying it was just about “care management”.

That mattered. When one of the the largest and most influential unions signals acceptance early, it narrows deliberation for everyone else.

It also revealed context not disclosed to members or the MLC: the UFT Welfare Fund has used UMR for benefits administration since 2020. During the meeting, counsel acknowledged that the UFT Welfare Fund had an exclusive seat at the initial discussions about prescription drug data sharing under the NYC Employees PPO—well before the issue was brought to other unions.

That history changes the frame. What was described as a new, collective, and exploratory proposal was not starting from the same place for everyone. One union entered the room with an existing partnership, early access, and influence—while others were being briefed in real time.

A Call to Action — For Union Leaders and Members

Union leaders are being asked to approve a deal that hands over members’ most sensitive health data—data that will be used to sort, score, and manage care—while being told the risks are minimal.

They should reject the data-sharing agreement.

Members also need to understand the reality: you will not be able to opt out of data sharing. At most, you may be able to opt out of outreach calls or emails from UMR and their “member education” — which amounts to why you or your family member’s claims and care are denied or delayed.

You and your dependent’s prescription data will still be transferred. Your information will still be analyzed. Your care can still be shaped by systems you never agreed to.

And you will never see your score from their proprietary blackbox.

If an algorithm labels you “high risk,” will you be told? Will you know what data was used? Will you be able to challenge it—or even confirm it exists?

Or will you simply feel the consequences—more delays, more denials, more scrutiny—without ever being told why?

When the presenters were asked if members will know their individual scores fueled by their union welfare prescription data, the answer was a flat out: NO!

That is not transparency. It is control without accountability.

Members should demand that their unions say no to this deal—and insist that no AI predictive system be adopted where people are scored, categorized, and managed in the dark without direct, transparent oversight, explicit safeguards and ability to directly appeal through human review by stakeholders.

A Line That Can’t Be Uncrossed

Prescription drug data will be shared weekly with United Healthcare’s deny and delay machine—unless unions stop it.

Risk scores will be created. AI tools will shape human care.

Leverage will be carried forward into bargaining.

This is not ‘business as usual’ or normal. It’s unusual.

The quiet part is no longer quiet.

The only question left is whether union leaders—and union members—act while they still can.

Learn more:

When members ask why union leadership is only fighting for 30/55 and not 25/55, the uncomfortable answer is this:

55/25 was already conceded.

And the concessions didn’t start with Cuomo.
They didn’t start with Tier 6.
They started with Randi Weingarten.

2009: The Deal That Built the Runway

On June 22, 2009, Mayor Bloomberg and UFT President Randi Weingarten jointly announced a so-called “New Age-55 Pension Plan.” The City’s own press release bragged about what the deal really was:

$100 million a year in savings for the City — for 20 years.

That savings didn’t come from Wall Street.
It came from future teachers.

To undo her own self-inflicted disaster from the 2005 contract—forcing teachers to report two days before Labor Day—Randi agreed to a contingent Memorandum of Agreement, pending Albany approval, that fundamentally altered the pension landscape.

Here’s what she gave up:

• Retirement moved from 55/25 to 57/25

• Career-long pension contributions for new hires

• Guaranteed TDA return cut from 8.25% to 7%

That deal is what many educators rightly call “Tier 4B.”
It was followed by the short-lived Tier 5, and then—inevitably—Tier 6.

Tier 6 didn’t come out of nowhere. The runway was built in 2009 by Randi and Unity.

Unity Didn’t Just Accept Givebacks — They Normalized Them

This wasn’t a one-off mistake. It was yet another banner moment where Unity institutionalized concession bargaining.

Every giveback was sold the same way:

• “Necessary”

• “Responsible”

• “For the common good”

• “ We achieved “cost savings for the City” while “improving our benefits”

And no one embodied that thinking more than Unity’s chief apologist, Randi’s longtime personal assistant, Leo Casey.

For decades, Casey has faithfully defended:

• The disastrous 2005 contract

• The 2009 pension concessions

• And now, copays imposed on retirees

Different issue. Same message:
Suck it up—for the common good.

His 2009 defense of the Bloomberg–Weingarten pension deal is still archived online, frozen in time, and devastating in hindsight.

While the Ground Was Being Given Away, There Was No Fight

Fast-forward to 2011–2012.

Bloomberg and Cuomo push through Tier 6, the worst pension tier in state history.

And where was Unity?

There was no mass mobilization.
No sustained organizing.
No serious resistance.

Now—13 years later—the same leadership claims they’re “fighting Tier 6,” while refusing to admit that:

• Extended years of service

• Lifetime pension contributions

• Reduced retirement security

…were already conceded on their watch.

James Eterno Warned Us — In Real Time

The late, great James Eterno saw exactly where this was heading and said so in 2009, when it still mattered.

He called it what it was:

A billion-dollar giveaway to save the City money — paid for by future educators.

He was right then. He’s right now.

All Roads Lead to Randi

This is why “Fix Tier 6” stops at 55/30.

Not because 55/25 is unrealistic. Not because it’s impossible.

But because Unity already surrendered it — quietly, strategically, and proudly — while calling it “responsible unionism.”

The same concession logic that gutted pensions is now being used to gut healthcare.

Different decade. Same playbook.

These are not the values of unionists.

These are Proxies for Management.

Morticians of our hard-earned benefits.

Receipts 👇

James Eterno on the 2009 giveback:
https://iceuftblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/billion-dollar-days-off.html?m=1

https://iceuftblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/june-da-report-farewell-randi-tier-v.html?m=1

Leo Casey defending the Bloomberg–Weingarten pension deal:
https://web.archive.org/web/20150606054122/http://www.edwize.org/uft-and-city-reach-agreement-on-pension-ending-two-days-before-labor-day

Unity’s failure to fight Tier 6 (2011–12):

A BETTER CONTRACT (ABC-UFT)

Mulgrew and Unity's TIER 6 BIG LIE: "We were caught by surprise in 2012 when 'Cuomo created Tier 6 in the dead of the night’."

Mulgrew’s administrative Unity caucus that has been behind many of the poor decisions and concessionary givebacks in the last couple of decades wants you to believe their TIER 6 BIG LIE…

Read more

a year ago · 17 likes · Dan Alicea

Editor’s note: To all those who celebrate: Happy Valentine’s Day. Shout out to The Tribe of Love.

Over the last few months, The Wire has reported on how the Municipal Labor Committee has been moving forward with the NYC Employee PPO, administered by UnitedHealthcare through its subsidiary UMR. That reporting showed the plan was built around strict cost targets and financial guarantees that depend on tighter control over how care is used — not just which doctors members can see, but how often care is approved, delayed, or denied.

More recently, The Wire revealed that a major piece of that arrangement involves prescription drug data held by union welfare funds. MLC leaders discussed that unlocking roughly $100 million in projected credits or savings was tied to insurers receiving pharmacy data covering most plan participants. That context matters because prescription data is a gold mine for UnitedHealthcare’s deny-and-delay machine. It allows the insurer to identify high-cost members, flag treatment patterns, train proprietary AI systems, and justify tighter utilization rules — often before a claim is even filed. Seen this way, the current push to obtain prescription data, and the effort to convince union leaders they do not need to go back to members for consent, is not incidental. It is the logical next step in a plan that relies on data to control care.

All of this is now being set up for a decision at today’s meeting of the Municipal Labor Committee. By then, MLC union leaders will already have the federal HIPAA documents in hand and will be asked to accept a simple conclusion: that consent is unnecessary and there is no real obligation to go back to members. That framing is not neutral. It is designed to settle the question before members ever have a chance to weigh in — even as leaders know the prescription data is central to the NYCE PPO deal, will directly feed UnitedHealthcare’s deny-and-delay systems, and carries legal and fiduciary risks under New York law. Once leaders proceed with full knowledge of what is at stake, responsibility for the consequences will rest squarely with those who chose to bypass members.

How HIPAA Is Being Used to Shrink the Question

The materials sent to MLC leaders focus almost entirely on one narrow point: federal HIPAA rules that permit health plans to share protected health information for “health care operations” without individual authorization.

What those materials do not do is address New York law. They do not discuss heightened state protections for certain health information. They do not analyze fiduciary duties owed by welfare fund trustees. And they do not confront the risks of centralizing massive volumes of prescription data inside a corporate insurer’s analytics systems.

By presenting HIPAA as the beginning and end of the legal analysis, the MLC reduces a major governance decision into a technical compliance exercise — and removes members from the process altogether.

Prescription Data Is a Medical Fingerprint

Prescription data is a medical fingerprint. It reveals who is sick, who is vulnerable, and who will cost an insurer money — all without a single member ever being asked for consent.

Even without diagnoses attached, prescription histories expose mental health treatment, HIV and PrEP use, cancer therapies, fertility care, and other deeply sensitive medical realities. Once centralized, that information becomes extraordinarily powerful.

And power, in this case, is not neutral.

Why UnitedHealthcare’s Track Record Matters

This data would not be going to a neutral bookkeeper. It would be going to UnitedHealthcare, the largest insurer in the country, operating through UMR, with its leading record of denying care more than anyone in the healthcare industry.

UnitedHealthcare has already shown what happens when health data is centralized at scale. In 2024, its Change Healthcare subsidiary suffered the largest health-care data breach in U.S. history, exposing personal and medical information tied to tens of millions of people. That breach did not occur because rules were ignored. It occurred inside a highly “compliant” system built for aggregation.

Under New York law, union leaders cannot pretend that lesson is irrelevant.

Data Isn’t Just Stored — It’s Weaponized

UnitedHealthcare is a leader in proprietary, AI-driven utilization management systems — technology designed to analyze patient data and generate automated or semi-automated decisions about coverage, prior authorization, and medical necessity.

These systems are opaque. Their logic is protected as trade secrets. And their incentives are aligned with cost containment.

Handing over prescription data doesn’t just satisfy an administrative request. It feeds those systems, sharpens them, and shifts decision-making further away from patients and clinicians — and toward algorithms members can’t see or challenge.

Calling this “health care operations” does not change what it is.

The “We’re Not Sharing It With the City” Red Herring

MLC leaders have also leaned on another talking point: that prescription data will not be shared with the City itself. That claim is a red herring. New York City is the sponsor of a self-funded NYCE PPO, and the City already sits at the center of this arrangement through its contracts, guarantees, and financial backstops.

Whether the data is technically handed to a City agency misses the point. What matters is that the data is being centralized inside the insurer and administrator that operate the City’s plan and make utilization decisions on its behalf. Once prescription data is embedded in UnitedHealthcare’s systems, it directly informs how the City’s self-funded plan is managed — how costs are controlled, which treatments face hurdles, and which members are flagged as financial risks. Saying “the City doesn’t get the data” distracts from the reality that the data will still be used to run the City’s plan intended to cut costs. The impact on members is exactly the same.

New York Law Still Applies

HIPAA is a federal floor. New York law goes further.

State law imposes heightened protections for HIV-related information, mental health treatment, and substance-use-related care — categories that can be plainly inferred from prescription data alone. New York also imposes independent data-security obligations and fiduciary duties on trustees that HIPAA does not erase.

None of that analysis appears in the materials circulated to MLC leaders.

Proceeding anyway does not make those issues disappear. It shifts the risk onto the trustees who approve the transfer.

This Is About Avoiding Members

If union leaders were required to go back to members and say, “We want to share your prescription histories with UnitedHealthcare and its administrator — do you agree?” the outcome would not be guaranteed.

Members might ask questions.

They might demand limits.

They might say no.

That uncertainty is exactly what this strategy is designed to avoid.

By asserting that consent is not required, the MLC bypasses the people with the most at stake. Once the data is shared, the decision cannot be undone. The precedent is set.

This Is a Choice — Made With Notice To Union Leaders

The federal HIPAA documents were sent to MLC leadership in advance of the meeting. Leaders were given the legal argument they need to move forward.

What they were not given — and what members were never given — is a full accounting of New York law, fiduciary responsibility, or the consequences of surrendering control over deeply personal health information.

At this point, moving forward is not a misunderstanding.

It is a choice.

HIPAA may allow this.

New York law may not.

And members were never asked.

That should concern everyone.

Learn more:

The Municipal Labor Committee has now put it in writing.

In a February 10, 2026 letter to union leaders, the MLC Executive Board confirms what The Wire has been warning about: a coordinated effort to extract prescription drug data from union welfare funds and hand it over to the insurance carriers behind the City’s new NYCE PPO — including UnitedHealthcare’s subsidiary, UMR.

This is not a new development.
It is an admission. A confession.

And it confirms what The Wire exposed in The $100 Million Secret: that the NYCE PPO was always partially built around data and weaponizing it in ways to cut their costs through denial and delay of care while more costs are transferred to us.

This Letter Confirms What the Deal Required All Along

When The Wire first reported on the NYCE PPO, union leaders insisted concerns about data were overblown. But the February 10 MLC letter makes clear that prescription drug data was never incidental to the plan — it was foundational.

The letter acknowledges that welfare funds are expected to “furnish” prescription drug data to carriers, and that once funds representing 75 percent of covered members comply, insurers receive contractual guarantees. That threshold is not accidental. It marks the point at which the dataset becomes large enough, clean enough, and complete enough to be operationalized.

In plain terms: the deal does not fully work unless the data flows.

Restructuring Drug Coverage — Not Improving It

The MLC wants members to believe this data will be used for benign “coordination.” But The $100 Million Secret explained why that language is misleading.

Prescription drug data tells insurers exactly where costs live — and exactly where restrictions can be imposed with the least resistance.

Once UnitedHealthcare and UMR have this data, they can see which drugs drive the most spending, which conditions are chronic, and which patients are dependent on long-term treatment. That is when coverage quietly changes. Formularies narrow. Drugs are reclassified into higher tiers. Prior authorizations multiply. Step therapy becomes routine.

This is not about improving care. It is about managing utilization by limiting access. And once carriers have the data, union welfare funds lose the leverage to fight those changes.

Data as a Weapon: Feeding UnitedHealthcare’s Algorithms

This is the part that is rarely said out loud — but was central to The $100 Million Secret.

UnitedHealthcare and its United Medical Resources (UMR) arm does not use data passively. It feeds it into proprietary AI systems and predictive algorithms designed to control cost and utilization at scale. Prescription drug data is among the most valuable inputs into those systems because it reveals not just past spending, but future risk.

With enough data, algorithms can predict which members are likely to require expensive drugs, which treatments can be delayed, and which patients are least likely to appeal denials. Those predictions are then used to automate decisions that used to require human judgment.

This is how denials become faster, coverage becomes narrower, and appeals become harder — without any single decision-maker taking responsibility.

Once union welfare fund data enters that system, it is no longer being used to help members. It is being used to train models that optimize insurer outcomes. The more complete the dataset, the more powerful the algorithms become.

And those algorithms do not disappear when a contract ends.

Undermining Welfare Funds Through “Efficiency”

As The $100 Million Secret warned, the long-term consequence of data sharing is not just tighter drug coverage. It is the erosion of union welfare funds themselves.

Armed with algorithmic analyses and utilization models, carriers can argue that independent welfare fund drug benefits are inefficient, redundant, or “out of alignment” with centralized systems. Data becomes the evidence used to justify consolidation.

Control shifts quietly — not through a vote, but through dashboards, models, and actuarial projections that only the insurer controls.

This is not partnership. It is displacement by design.

UFT and UMR: The Move Members Were Never Told About

There is another fact members deserve to know.

The UFT has used UMR as a third-party administrator for prescription drug benefits since 2020, as union 990 tax filings reveal — years before the City and MLC formally adopted UMR as part of the NYCE PPO.

Members were never informed. There was no announcement, no explanation, no vote. By the time UMR appeared publicly in City healthcare plans, it had already been embedded inside UFT welfare fund benefits. Nor any ownership about this decision that was likely affected by the big UHC data breach, in 2024.

Did Geof Sorkin, Welfare Fund Director, send us notification about any of this? No.

All of this matters. It means today’s push for prescription data is not a new request. It is the expansion of an arrangement that was deliberately kept out of view.

“HIPAA-Compliant” Is Not the Same as Safe — UnitedHealthcare’s Record Speaks Volumes

The MLC letter leans heavily on assurances of confidentiality and HIPAA compliance if welfare funds share member prescription data. But in the real world, compliance promises mean very little when the corporation at the center of the plan has presided over the largest healthcare data breach in U.S. history.

In February 2024, the tech unit of UnitedHealth Group — the parent of UnitedHealthcare and owner of Change Healthcare, a major healthcare IT and claims processing business in coordination with UMR— was hit by a devastating ransomware attack carried out by the BlackCat criminal group. According to data posted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and reported by Reuters, the breach ultimately impacted approximately 192.7 million people, dwarfing any other healthcare breach on record in the United States.

What makes this breach especially consequential for our debate about data sharing is the type of information that was compromised. The breach affected:

• diagnoses

• treatment details

• health insurance member IDs

• billing codes

• personal information including Social Security numbers

This wasn’t limited to generic metadata. It was the kind of sensitive information that welfare fund trustees would be asked to hand over if they consent to prescription data sharing under the NYCE PPO.

And the scale of the incident is staggering. Nearly the entire U.S. population was affected — more than half the country’s residents — simply because of one vulnerability in UnitedHealth’s systems.

This was no minor mishap. It was the largest breach ever recorded in the American healthcare system. Other insurers and healthcare IT vendors have experienced breaches affecting millions or tens of millions of records, but UnitedHealth’s incident stands apart in its breadth and severity.

If a company with that track record is asking for access to union welfare fund prescription data, simply because a memo says “we’ll comply with HIPAA,” that should set off alarm bells.

HIPAA compliance means following a set of rules; it does not mean a corporation can secure your data.

And if we’ve learned anything from the Change Healthcare breach — it’s that possessing enormous amounts of sensitive health information can make a company a prime target for hackers, and that when such data is breached, the fallout is massive and long-lasting.

Trust cannot be built on letters, emails and legal assurances alone.
It must be earned through security practices, contractual safeguards, transparency, and a track record of protecting what matters most: people’s lives and their personal information.

Or, maybe we should just trust United Healthcare to pay out a $22m ransom from our tax dollars to the hackers, again?

This Is the Moment to Refuse Consent

The MLC insists this process is voluntary. But tying financial guarantees to data surrender turns choice into pressure. Union leaders are being asked to trade permanent loss of control for temporary assurances — and to do so quietly.

They will be meeting on Friday, February 13th with the MLC bosses to strategize how to pressure the rest of us into this scheme.

Once prescription data is transferred, it cannot be retrieved. No agreement can undo the loss of leverage that follows.

This is the line.

Union welfare fund trustees and union leaders have a fiduciary duty to protect member benefits and privacy. That duty requires refusing consent, demanding full disclosure, and insisting that members — not back-room committees or algorithms — decide what happens to their data. And, when necessary, renegotiating for specific and meaningful safeguards in our healthcare agreements.

The Wire warned that this moment was coming. The MLC letter confirms it.

The only question left is whether anyone will stop it.

We must not consent.

No means no, Mr. Mulgrew and Mr. Sorkin.

Learn more:

My name is David Kazansky, and I want to be your trustee on the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System board.

This spring, you face an important decision about your pension and your retirement security. At its core, this is a decision about who you want safeguarding something you earn over a lifetime of work.

The election of a member-trustee gives TRS members real power.

The question is whether we choose to use it.

A Real Choice — Not a Symbolic One

Michael Mulgrew and his UFT leadership will announce a candidate of their choosing. But you get to decide who represents you on the TRS board.

Too often, members are presented with what appears to be a choice but functions merely as a symbolic one. My candidacy is about making sure this election offers a real choice, not just the illusion of one.

What Serving as a Trustee Actually Means

I faithfully served as a teacher trustee on the NYC TRS board from 2015 to 2024. That experience taught me that the role of a trustee is not to be taken lightly.

Trustees are responsible for judgment, oversight, and asking the right questions when decisions involve risk. Silence, deference, and inaction can be just as risky as bad decisions. When trustees stop examining long-term economic impacts critically, risk does not magically disappear. It grows.

There was a time when TRS, led by its member-trustees, was widely seen as a leader in combining thoughtful stewardship with strong investment performance. I believe our pension fund should reclaim that role. And I know that my being on the board is a meaningful step in that direction.

The TRS board needs trustees willing to ask hard questions, exercise independent judgment, and bring both the willingness and expertise to make tough decisions.

Why I’m Running Again

After reflection and conversations with family, friends, colleagues, and rank-and-file members, I have decided to run again to represent you as your trustee.

This is familiar territory for me. After all, the UFT enthusiastically endorsed me for each of my previous three campaigns. I have coordinated eight years of trustee elections for the UFT. I know how nominees are selected, how endorsements are made, and how the election should be conducted.

Michael Mulgrew and his UFT leadership will announce a candidate of their choosing. But members are not bound by that decision. You have the power to initiate an election and elect the candidate you believe is best suited to protect your retirement.

That power matters.

Independence Is a Fiduciary Duty

Markets change. Assumptions change. Investment strategies evolve. Pension policy made today has long-term impacts on the retirement security of educators across this city.

Trustees must be willing to engage critically, challenge consensus when necessary, and put members’ long-term interests ahead of convenience, politics, or personal ambition. I have done that work, and I am prepared to do it again.

I know that many members are nearing retirement and focused on protecting what they have earned, while others are just beginning their careers and counting on this pension decades from now. A trustee has a responsibility to take both perspectives seriously, because today’s decisions affect them all.

In the weeks ahead, I will make the case for electing a trustee who will ask hard questions on the TRS board. Independence is not a talking point. It is the foundation of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. I will speak openly about my experience, my judgment, and my independence, because those qualities matter when real risk is involved.

Serving as my alternate in the trustee election is Ben Morgenroth, an adjunct lecturer in mathematics at Hunter College and a veteran NYC public school teacher. He holds degrees in applied mathematics and economics, and previously worked as a quantitative analyst evaluating investment risk and performance. His experience gives me confidence that members would be well served if the alternate provision were ever needed.

A Pension That Belongs to All of Us

I will need your help. Petitions must be signed, and conversations must happen. I cannot visit schools during the workday the way full-time union representatives can, but I will be responsive and show up when it matters.

If you have questions, I will answer them. If I do not have an answer immediately, I will be straight with you about that, and I will make sure to find it and get back to you—because every question I hear from one person is usually something thousands of others are thinking about, or worrying about, too.

To every UFT member, CSA member, and PSC-CUNY member in NYC TRS: this pension belongs to all of us. It was built over more than a century through hard work and shared commitment. It deserves trustees who take that responsibility seriously.

You have the power to initiate an election and elect the person you believe is best equipped to protect your retirement.

If you give me your trust, your support, and your vote, I will honor all three by exercising independent judgment, asking hard questions when risk is involved, and putting your long-term retirement security first. Always.

We Trust David website

Press Release

Download Nominating Petitions

Join the campaign

Email campaign

Leroy Barr Abruptly Out—

Leroy Barr, long-time Staff Director and head of the Unity Caucus, suddenly announced his retirement at the last DA, saying it would be his last one. No warning. No fanfare. Just poof, gone. Even Mulgrew expressed some surprise at the time and place of the announcement.

Behind the polished speeches, the Unity leadership machine has been showing cracks going back to the major Unity defections in last year’s elections where Unity received 54% of the vote, the lowest in history. Mulgrew responded, like the authoritarian he is, with firings and threats.

Was he pushed or did he jump?

LeRoy Barr was considered a powerhouse in the UFT, one of the three men in the room — along with Mulgrew and Mike Sill — with many considering Barr as a possible successor to Mulgrew. So his sudden retirement came as a shock given his relatively young age and high level position — and his salary. Speculation began soon after his announcement as to whether he was going willingly or was pushed.

There have been leaks about internal conflict at the top levels of the UFT to the extent that even ex UFT president and current AFT President Randi Weingarten intervened, not on the side of Barr, thus leading to his leaving.

Purges are designed to use fear of going back to the classroom for full-time UFT employees and loss of income to part-timers as a method of control while attempting to manage the membership. If a certain age, retirement is an option.

Membership interests ignored as Leadership get the perks and Members get the short end.

For everyday members, this is just another reminder that Unity’s leadership engages in internal power plays while the members suffer.

Meanwhile: The promised Para Pay is still a mess and Tier 6 reforms are stalled.

LeRoy Barr has been a leader of a prominent African-American contingent in Unity, including officers Janella Hinds, Karen Alford and Leo Gordon, and the influential Anthony Harmon, among others. But with the subtraction of Barr, the real decision-makers in the UFT comes down to Mulgrew, Emily James, Mary Vaccaro, Mike Sill and non-UFT member and never a teacher, Ellie Engler, who seems to have won out in her battle with Barr. Racial dynamics tend not to be subtle.

Members are right to ask who really runs this union, whose voices matter, and whether the broader national attack on DEI and racial equity is creeping into UFT decision-making. When leadership won’t answer these questions, distrust fills the vacuum.

Bennett, Fischer, and the Retiree Chapter

UFT Retiree Chapter Leader Bennett Fischer, and the Retiree Advocate caucus which took power in the last chapter election continue to struggle as leaders of the chapter. Instead of going to the members, being transparent, and using their position to expose Unity’s mismanagement, they close ranks and hope Mulgrew tosses them a few crumbs. Their decision to run in the UFT general election with the ARISE coalition, instead of being neutral, led to a split among retirees that has still not been healed. They’re supposed to build power for retirees—but instead, they seem to fear Mulgrew and Unity retaliation if they get too militant in challenging them. Instead of reminding retirees at every opportunity that the Unity retirees worked hard to move them out of Medicare and into Medicate Advantage, they play footsie with the leadership even when they are pushed around, and instead of going public, they write strongly worded letters, ala Chuck Shumer and the Democratic Party.

The year and a half old retiree chapter leadership seems to be exhibiting the same pattern we see in Unity: secrecy, closed-door meetings, and a focus on protecting the RTC leadership from criticism, rather than fighting for those who elected them. Some RTC members are getting increasingly restive, while leadership scrambles to preserve its control with performative feel-good virtue signalling resolutions.

TRS Teachers Trustee Election: Time to Stand Up

Here’s where it gets interesting.

In last May’s union-wide election, Unity won with 54 percent of the vote, their lowest total in history, not exactly a mandate. Just as we watch the outcomes of bi-elections, like the recent Democratic win in Texas in a district where Trump won by 17 points, a 34 point flip, we also have elections in the UFT that can be a sign of member sentiment. And don’t forget the massive shift in the 2024 retiree chapter election where Unity dropped from 70 to 37%. But if the RA/RTC leadership doesn’t get its act together, this margin won’t hold and Unity threatens to regain control.

The UFT elects three members to the Teacher Retirement System to three year terms with a member being elected every year in early May, with the election being run in the schools by DOE, not UFT, rules. Unity has controlled all these positions for decades with no opposition. There has been only one election and that was two years ago. Last year Unity petition challenges managed to get the opposition candidate knocked off the ballot. This year promises to see a serious campaign and the outcome will be a serious sign of just how much Unity’s grip has weakened. Look for announcements in the coming days.

Questions we should be asking:

Will A Better Contract run a candidate?

Will independent members finally push back against Unity’s control?

Will ABC, New Action, and MORE work together for the betterment of our union?

This isn’t just another vote—it’s a chance to say enough. Unity can’t keep running things behind closed doors while members get ignored.

Bottom Line

Unity leadership keeps purging, scheming, and protecting itself. Meanwhile, members lose out on pay, benefits, and even basic wins. The cracks are showing—and the upcoming trustee election could be a significant moment where members take back some control.

If leadership won’t represent members, maybe it’s time we elect people who will.

The video is cheerful. Festive, even. A holiday greeting, a thank-you, a warm smile. A union officer, VP of Education Mary Vaccaro, and a senior staffer, Kayla McCormack, stand before the camera and solicit teachers to a shopping event. The message is clear and repeated with enthusiasm: buy jewelry, and 20 percent of every purchase goes back to the union’s Teacher Center.

The company being promoted is Kendra Scott.

The institution lending its voice, credibility, and reach is the United Federation of Teachers.

What’s less visible—but far more consequential—is the trade quietly embedded in the sales pitch.

The Little Yellow Libraries

The multi-year partnership is often justified by pointing to “little yellow libraries”: brightly branded classroom libraries donated to a small number of New York City public schools. The libraries are real. Teachers and students benefit from them. No one disputes that.

But philanthropy is defined not just by what is given—but by what is demanded in return.

Here, the exchange is unmistakable. In return for a limited number of highly visible, brand-forward libraries, a global jewelry retailer gains something far more valuable: direct, repeated access to one of the largest labor unions in the country, a union whose membership is more than 75 percent women—precisely the demographic the brand is built to reach.

This is not charity in the traditional sense. It is cause marketing, routed through a labor organization.

The video makes that plain. A union officer thanks Kendra Scott for its work with New York City public schools. A senior union staffer—introducing herself as the director of the Teacher Center—welcomes viewers to “our Kendra Scott event” and explains the incentive: shop, and the union benefits. The union is not a passive recipient of a donation. It is an active sales partner.

That distinction matters.

True philanthropy does not require a shopping cart. It does not hinge on consumer conversion rates. It does not depend on union officers and staff becoming de facto brand ambassadors. If the goal were simply to support students and libraries, the libraries would exist independent of retail events, discount codes, and promotional videos.

Instead, the model works the other way around. A handful of schools receive mini-libraries. Tens of thousands of educators are encouraged—by their own union—to buy jewelry. The upside for students is limited and localized. The upside for the corporation is scalable and ongoing.

The Real Ethical Problem: Kendra Scott’s Poor Labor Record

And there is another layer the cheerful tone of the video never acknowledges: labor.

Independent ethical-fashion reviewers such as Good On You assign Kendra Scott a “Not Good Enough” overall rating—including a 2 out of 5 for workers’ rights—based on how much the brand discloses about its supply chain and labor safeguards.

Good On You notes that the company’s products are sourced through “final stage of production from countries with high risk of labour abuse,” and that there is no public evidence it ensures living wages, financial security for suppliers, or diversity and inclusion in its supply chain.

There is no public evidence that Kendra Scott’s supply chain involves proven sweatshops — while the risk is very high based on where supplies are sourced.

Kendra Scott is not unionized, either.

Yet the absence of transparency and publicly verifiable worker protections is exactly the kind of risk traditional labor solidarity and ethical sourcing standards are meant to avoid. A teachers’ union, of all institutions, should recognize the difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence.

Historically, unions draw bright lines between worker advocacy and corporate promotion precisely to avoid this kind of contradiction.

A union’s power comes from trust: trust that its leaders will put workers first, trust that its voice will not be rented out, trust that solidarity does not stop at national borders or at the checkout counter.

The little yellow libraries complicate that trust. They are good, visible, emotionally resonant. They make criticism almost uncomfortable. Who wants to argue against books for children?

But when classroom libraries become the justification for turning a union into a sales channel—when profit-seeking access to a women-majority workforce is the unspoken price of generosity—the question isn’t whether the libraries help. They do.

The question is whether they are being used as leverage.

A labor union should not have to ask its members to shop at repeated events in order to uphold its values. Nor under the cover of promoting schools or the union. And it should not need a jewelry brand’s marketing budget to support literacy.

When a union officer and staffer stand before the camera and sell a retail event, the issue is no longer about holiday cheer or fundraising creativity. It is about boundaries—and who benefits when those boundaries dissolve.

Libraries should be gifts, not profit-making gateways.

Solidarity should not be conditional on consumer consumption.

Our union leadership is struggling to mobilize our union to attend union rallies and yet they put their energy into this? What has happened to our union values?

More Questions Union Leadership Should Answer

1. What criteria were used to choose which schools received yellow libraries, and why were teachers asked to shop as part of that exchange?

2. Kendra Scott’s public disclosures describe ethical intentions and policies, but independent reviewers note the absence of publicly verifiable evidence on wages, worker protections, and factory-level conditions.

   What steps, if any, did the union take to assess whether those stated intentions reflect the lived reality of the non-union workers who actually manufacture these products before promoting the brand to its members?

3. Did the union conduct any supply-chain or labor-rights due diligence on Kendra Scott before promoting the shopping event to tens of thousands of educators?

4. Why is a labor union endorsing a global consumer brand whose workers are overwhelmingly non-union and whose publicly assessed workers’ rights record is rated “Not Good Enough” by independent ethical reviewers?

5. Is there a written policy governing when and how union officers can use official channels to promote private corporate partners? If so, why was it applied here? If not, why not?

6. How does the union reconcile promoting consumer spending with its core mission to advocate for fair wages, safe conditions, and worker dignity—especially when Good On You and others note a lack of evidence Kendra Scott ensures living wages or supplier financial security?

7. Will the union publicly disclose any evaluations it performed regarding Kendra Scott’s labor practices and supply-chain transparency?

8. What safeguards are in place to ensure that no union officer or staff member receives any personal benefit—financial, professional, or reputational—from promoting or participating in corporate partnerships like the Kendra Scott shopping events?

9. Is it appropriate for a primarily state-funded Teacher Center to participate in retail shopping promotions, and what assurances exist that such activities comply with the program’s grant requirements and intended public purpose?

10. If a Kendra Scott shopping event promised a 20% giveback to the UFT Teacher Center, in which fiscal year was that apparent fundraising revenue received, and where is it reported on the most recent Form 990s for the UFT non-profit that it falls under? If it was restricted, why does the Foundation report zero net assets with donor restrictions?

    ---

    Thanks for reading The Wire: Powered by Educators of NYC! This post is public so feel free to share it.

    Share

We’re about to reach an important milestone: we are approaching 4,500 signatures on the Stop Charging Retirees petition. Our first goal of 5,000 is now within reach today!

That number matters. It represents thousands of conversations, shared concerns, and a growing recognition that UFT retirees on fixed incomes should not be charged for prescription healthcare coverage while retirees in other NYC unions pay nothing. It shows that this issue resonates widely — and that people are ready to move from concern to action.

This moment isn’t about slowing down or complacency.

It’s about expanding outward so we can move to 10k and beyond!

We will be heard.

Phase Two: From Awareness to Organization

As we approach 5,000 signatures, we are entering Phase Two of this campaign — taking the petition beyond individual shares and into our schools, retirement communities, neighborhoods, and everyday spaces where educators connect.

To support this next phase, we’ve built out a Digital Share Toolkit — a one-stop organizing page with everything needed to share the campaign, collect signatures, and start conversations both online and in person.

👉 Visit the Share Toolkit: https://stopchargingretirees.org/ShareToolkit

We are also going to invite you to our first Zoom Rally in the coming days.

What’s Available on the Share Toolkit Page

The Share Toolkit is designed to make organizing simple, flexible, and accessible — whether you’re helping one person sign or organizing many.

🔗 One-Click Petition Sharing

At the top of the page, you’ll find easy sharing tools that let you:

• Share the petition link

• Share directly to Facebook, X/Twitter, Bluesky, LinkedIn, or email

• Send the petition quickly in group chats or texts

These tools make it easy to spread the word in seconds.

📝 Downloadable Petition & Flyers

The toolkit includes print-ready materials for in-person organizing :

• Official Stop Charging Retirees Petition (PDF) - Download and print to collect handwritten signatures from colleagues, neighbors, friends, and family.

• Campaign Flyers - Designed to explain the issue clearly and direct people to sign.

• Black & White Flyer- Optimized for mass copying — ideal for schools, retirement communities, and meetings.

These materials make it easy to organize even when Wi-Fi isn’t available.

📱 Shareable Images for Social Media

The toolkit also includes a growing library of downloadable graphics sized and styled for social media , including:

• Clear, fact-based visuals showing that UFT retirees pay up to $3,420/year while other NYC unions pay $0

• Campaign milestone graphics (including 3.5k+ signed visuals)

• “Paying premiums on a fixed income is not a game” series images using familiar visuals

These images are ready to post, text, or email — no design work needed.

🗣️ Stories & Video Testimonials

The Share Toolkit also features community stories and videos from retirees and active educators explaining why this campaign matters to them .

If you’d like to add your voice, you can record a short video directly through the site — no script, no production required.

🎥 Record your video here: https://stopchargingretirees.org/RecordTestimonial

Sharing a story can be as simple as explaining why you signed or why this issue affects you or someone you care about.

📣 Ready-to-Use Messages & Click-to-Share Posts

For those who want help finding the right words, the toolkit includes pre-written messages you can copy or share instantly :

• One-click posts for X/Twitter and Bluesky

• Short Instagram story text

• Longer Facebook and LinkedIn posts

• Fact-based messages highlighting the cost disparity

These messages make it easy to share confidently without having to draft something from scratch.

Take the Petition Where You Are

Phase Two is about visibility and connection. It’s about relational organizing.

We encourage supporters to:

• Pass the paper petition in your school building

• Share flyers in your retirement community

• Bring the petition to meetings, lunches, or gatherings

• Use a WiFi-enabled phone or tablet to help people sign online on the spot

• Share campaign images and messages with friends and family

Every signature starts with a conversation — and every conversation builds pressure for change.

This Is How We Grow a People-Powered Campaign

Approaching 4,500 signatures shows what’s possible when educators and retirees organize together. The Share Toolkit exists to help all of us take the next step — in ways that feel practical, personal, and sustainable.

📌 Share the link

📌 Print the petition

📌 Post an image

📌 Start a conversation

Together, we stop charging retirees.

👉 Sign or share the petition: https://stopchargingretirees.org

👉 Access the Share Toolkit: https://stopchargingretirees.org/ShareToolkit

👉 Share your story (optional): https://stopchargingretirees.org/RecordTestimonial

After decades of service in New York City classrooms, UFT retirees are being forced to pay monthly premiums for prescription drug coverage—at the very moment in life when fixed incomes and rising medical needs collide.

That’s why we’re organizing now.
🎯 Our goal: 5,000 petition signatures by the end of next week.
Every name matters. Every share counts.

👉 SIGN THE PETITION NOW: https://stopchargingretirees.org

✊ We Are Demanding Change — Not Making Polite Requests

This campaign is about UFT retirees and a policy that has quietly but dramatically raised healthcare costs for them over time:

• 💊 $180 per person per month for prescription drug coverage for UFT retirees

• 💑 $360 per month for couples

• 📈 Premiums have increased by roughly 50% in just two years

• 💵 A $900 annual refund for members (not spouses) still leaves retirees paying:

  • $1,260 per year (individuals)

  • $3,420 per year (couples)

That is not “premium-free healthcare,” no matter how often leadership says it is.

UFT retirees earned these benefits through years — often decades — of service. They should not be balancing medication costs against groceries, rent, or utilities.

Many major unions subsidize this premium cost through their welfare funds. Presently, the UFT Welfare Fund is sitting on over 1 billion dollars in reserve. In fact, the current size of the Welfare Fund nest egg is the result of bulk transfers of tax-payer monies from the City’s now insolvent Healthcare Stabilization Fund.

💬 UFT Retirees Are Speaking Out

Across the city, retirees are sharing their stories — stories of anxiety, anger, and betrayal, but also of solidarity and resolve.

📢 Read their testimonials here:
https://stopchargingretirees.org/Testimonials

These are not isolated complaints. They are a pattern — and they demand a response.

📰 This Fight Is Happening Right Now

From organizing efforts to public pressure campaigns, retirees and allies are pushing back and demanding accountability.

🗞 Follow the latest updates here: https://stopchargingretirees.org/News

🚀 Help Us Reach 5,000 Signatures by the End of the Week

We are close — but we need a strong final push towards our first goal. Then, we push for 10k.

Here’s how you can help today:

✅ Sign the petition:
👉 https://stopchargingretirees.org

✅ Share the petition everywhere
Facebook • X / Twitter • Instagram • BlueSky • Email • Group chats

📣 Share this link: https://stopchargingretirees.org

Tag fellow retirees. Tag active members. Tag anyone who believes retirees should not be nickel-and-dimed for healthcare they were promised.

💥 Why This Matters

UFT retirees kept New York City running — through overcrowded classrooms, budget cuts, crises, and pandemics. Forcing them to absorb ever-increasing healthcare premiums after retirement is wrong, unnecessary, and avoidable.

If we show up together, loudly and visibly, we can force this issue into the open — and force change.

✊ Sign. Share. Help us hit 5,000 now.

SIGN THE PETITION NOW

Related:

They’re the parent-led nonprofit that won the class size law, keeps pressure on City Hall, exposes DOE missteps, and pushes for real space, real staffing, and real equity in every neighborhood.

If you care about equitable outcomes for every NYC public school student, now is the moment to step up. Your donation keeps this momentum going — and helps ensure smaller classes become a reality for all kids, not just some.

Give today. Fight for every child’s chance to thrive.

Here is Executive Director of Class Matters Leonie Haimson’s latest report on the vital work they champion:

2025: A watershed year for Class Size Matters. Will you support our work to ensure more progress in 2026?

Dear all:

This has been a watershed year for class size in NYC public schools. Nearly 750 schools lowered class size this fall to far smaller levels, and about 60% of classes achieved the benchmarks required by the law which we helped pass in 2022. In these classrooms, many teachers are ecstatic about the changes they’ve seen, and hundreds of thousands of students are benefiting as a result. Whether or not your child was among them, please consider giving to Class Size Matters.

Yet class sizes still vary widely across the city’s districts and neighborhoods, causing far too many students to struggle. About 78,500 students in grades K through 5^th are still jammed into classes of twenty five or more, and in middle and high schools, there are more than 24,000 classes of thirty or more with about 760,000 students.

Regrettably, DOE has done little to create space for the hundreds of overcrowded schools that do not have the capacity for smaller classes, either by building enough new schools or annexes, or aligning their enrollment to class size goals. Please donate to our work, so we can keep fighting for every NYC student to receive the smaller classes they need and deserve .

Some other highlights of our work in 2025:

• After we blew the whistle that the School Construction Authority board had lacked its legally required three members for over two years, another member was finally appointed. The same thing happened when we pointed out their lack of a mandated whistleblower policy – they created one.

• Along with other advocates, we alerted the NYC Department of Health that Talkspace, which has a $27 million contract with the City to provide online mental health services to teens, was collecting their personal data, sharing it with social media companies, and using it for marketing purposes. After months of continued pressure, we finally convinced the DOH to rewrite their contract with the company, require that Talkspace remove social media trackers from their webpages, and rewrite the Teenspace Privacy Policy.

• We were the first to reveal publicly that the data of more than 3,000 current and former NYC students in the PowerSchool student information system had been breached, after the DOE had denied this to reporters. This announcement helped lead to affected families being alerted to the breach, even if belatedly.

• We persuaded DOE to strengthen their Chancellor’s regulations to include a provision that any individual or company provided with access to personal student information must have a written contract establishing how that information will be protected from further disclosure or misuse.

• Just a few weeks ago, along with other concerned advocates, teachers and students, we helped persuade the Panel for Educational Policy to reject four proposed DOE contracts with companies selling AI programs.

• We now have a petition calling on our new Mayor, Zohran Mamdani, to enact a moratorium on AI use in schools so that rigorous protections against harm to students and the environment can be established. Please sign our petition, if you haven’t already.

There is a theme that runs through all of our work: to ensure that human relationships are centered in the learning experience of NYC schools. If you want to help us achieve this goal, please make a tax-deductible donation to Class Size Matters.

Happy New Year, Leonie

Donate Now

Sign up here to get the latest stories from THE CITY delivered to you each morning.

An explosive audit from City Comptroller Brad Lander recommends dissolving a fund that helps finance city employees health benefits, concluding that it is billions of dollars in the red after being tapped for years by municipal unions and mayors in labor bargaining.

Declaring the fund “insolvent,” Lander’s auditors determined that the Health Insurance Stabilization Fund owes the city $3.1 billion, not counting obligations that have yet to be tallied for fiscal years 2024 and 2025.

The city’s Office of Labor Relations and the Municipal Labor Committee, the consortium of 102 public sector unions, “did not take adequate steps to improve the Fund’s position,” Lander wrote in an introduction to the report, released Tuesday. The fund is paid for by taxpayers and jointly managed by the city and the MLC.

“Ordinarily, the audit would propose recommendations to management to address deficiencies. However, given that [the fund] is insolvent and cannot meet its intended purpose, the audit recommends that the City work with the MLC to dissolve the Fund,” Lander wrote. “The City should also appropriately budget for healthcare costs and benefits.”

The labor relations team for Mayor Eric Adams says the funds were not misused, and both the city and unions say that the funds have been used consistently with their intended purpose of helping pay for employee health care.

The audit also describes a controversial proposed move to a lower-cost Medicare Advantage plan for city retirees as being a direct response to projections of the fund’s looming insolvency — a conclusion the city and the unions do not dispute. Adams abandoned that switch after massive pushback from retirees and elected officials that included a lengthy legal battle.

Established in the mid-1980s, the unions and City Hall created the Health Insurance Stabilization Fund to help cover the cost of adding a new health plan, GHI, for city employees in addition to longstanding HIP coverage. The idea was for the fund to pay for the difference in costs between the two, depending on their premiums.

A 1995 agreement specified that the fund should only be used for that purpose, known as equalization, and also said that in the event the fund ran dry, the Municipal Labor Committee “must reduce benefits and/or impose employee/retiree payroll deductions to satisfy the shortfall,” according to the audit.

As the fund grew and health costs soared, the city Office of Labor Relations and the city’s unions began using the fund to pay for billions in supplemental benefits and for workers’ raises — deviating from the fund’s intended purpose of balancing premium rates and setting it on course to insolvency, the comptroller’s audit found.

The probe paints a picture of the city and the unions using the fund as a virtual piggy bank, authorizing $4.3 billion from 2001 to 2024 in lump sum payments to the city and to union-administered general welfare funds, including $1 billion to cover the costs of raises, deferred layoffs and other benefits.

A turning point, the financial analysis suggests, was a 2014 Healthcare Savings Agreement brokered by the administration of Mayor Bill de Blasio to settle union contracts that had expired under his predecessor, Michael Bloomberg. That deal reduced the city’s obligations to pay into the health fund as part of a health care cost savings scheme and ultimately shrunk the fund’s balance by $3.3 billion. Routine expenses for additional benefits including prescription drug, chemotherapy and weight loss programs also got charged to the fund, according to the audit.

A spokesperson for the mayor did not respond to a request for comment about the audit. Henry Garrido, a co-chair of the MLC and the head of the city’s largest municipal workers’ union, could not be reached for comment.

Few Records

In detailed responses to auditors, the city’s Office of Labor Relations and the Municipal Labor Committee argued that the fund can be used for any mutually agreed upon purpose, and that nothing prevented them from modifying the use of the fund through collective bargaining. The funds were used to pay for essential benefits, the city and the MLC told auditors.

However, neither OLR nor the MLC dispute the recommendation that the stabilization fund be dissolved.

“The Stabilization Fund’s assets were not misused at any time. They were used to pay for essential benefits for City employees as agreed to through collective bargaining, including coverage of prescription drugs through the welfare funds, the PICA program providing lifesaving specialty drugs, averting layoffs, and funding labor agreements for the entire workforce,” OLR commissioner Renee Campion wrote in response to a draft version of the audit on Dec. 3.

“There is nothing improper about any of these uses, which were agreed to by the MLC and every individual union through the collective bargaining process.”

The MLC, in a response attributed to its board members, struck a similar chord.

“The Stabilization Fund was created through collective bargaining between the City and the MLC, and never set up to operate under strict limitations of purpose,” they wrote on Dec. 3. “It is governed not by a single 40-year-old agreement, but by the New York City Collective Bargaining Law which empowers the MLC and the City to enter into agreements and then later modify those agreements to address changing circumstances.”

But the comptroller’s office found no record of modifications. It determined that the responses from the OLR and the MLC “do not sufficiently reckon with the nature of the original 1985 agreement and their mutual obligations as a result of the restricted nature of the Fund.”

News of the imminent audit went public last week, after THE CITY obtained audio from an MLC membership meeting where the group’s de facto leader dismissed the probe as misguided and politically motivated.

In that Dec. 16 meeting, Garrido railed against the comptroller’s probe as “outrageous,” “unprecedented” and a “political stunt.” Lander, who released the probe on the second-to-last day of his term as comptroller, is running for Congress in a district encompassing parts of Brooklyn and lower Manhattan.

The MLC executive board condemned the meeting leak in a Dec. 26 internal memo and despaired that its efforts to correct or defer what they described as a “false and biased” probe by Lander’s staff to the next comptroller, Mark Levine, may not materialize as a result of the breach.

“Here, when faced with a false and biased assessment of the Stabilization Fund by Comptroller staff, one we were seeking to correct if not defer to the next administration, we cannot possibly imagine what was to be gained by leaking the discussion,” the executive board wrote. “Those prospects may well be now dimmed.”

Garrido is a leader of Levine’s transition committee. A spokesperson for Levine’s transition did not respond to a request for comment.

With the probe, Lander is inserting himself into a long-simmering conflict between the unions and the administration of Mayor Eric Adams that this spring exploded into public view over which side is responsible for billions of dollars in pledged health care savings.

The comptroller’s audit determined that the city and the MLC knew that the fund was near insolvency as far back as 2018 — and drew up a controversial plan to switch retirees to Medicare Advantage specifically to make up for the funding shortfall. Adams championed but eventually abandoned that effort even after being cleared by the state’s highest court to proceed, and neither his administration nor the MLC have identified any alternatives.

An additional cost-saving measure to switch the city’s active workers to a self-insured plan jointly administered by EmblemHealth and UnitedHealthcare is slated to go into effect on Jan. 1 and save taxpayers a maximum $900 million annually. But the Comptroller’s outlook is far less rosy, with auditors claiming that the sum “would not ensure the solvency of [the fund] even if achieved.”

The comptroller’s office also determined that the fund “lacks transparency and has inadequate governance and decision-making capacity,” and alleges that the city’s labor negotiators submitted inaccurate statements to auditors, including “false annual certifications” of compliance with accounting standards.

Meeting agendas and other records were lacking, the audit found, and financial disclosures excluded “significant unreported liabilities.”

“The Fund balances were not accurate, and the Fund, which was established for the purpose of maintaining a reserve, has no reserves and is unable to meet its financial obligations,” according to the audit.

Read The City's original article here

Read the audit here

Editor’s Note:

Articles published by THE CITY are free to republish under the Creative Commons Attribution license.

Related articles:

For years, city workers and retirees have been told a familiar story:

Healthcare concessions were necessary, painful but unavoidable, and required to generate “cost savings” for the City. We were told these sacrifices were about sustainability. About protecting benefits. About avoiding worse outcomes.

We needed to save and replenish the depleted NYC Healthcare Stabilization Fund – or it would collapse, and we would have no choice but to pay healthcare premiums.

But buried in plain sight is an admission that turns that entire narrative on its head.

In a recent closed-door Municipal Labor Committee meeting, MLC and UFT attorney Alan Klinger acknowledged that a central goal of the City–Union Tripartite Health Committee was not to save the Healthcare Stabilization Fund (HSF)—but to eliminate it altogether.

Not through open debate. Not through a vote of the MLC body. But through a quiet, structural decision made by a tiny group of three individuals operating far from rank-and-file eyes and ears.

When asked about why the City no longer would meet its obligations to pay benefits for 9/11 widows and orphans through the HSF, Klinger told the MLC’s union leaders:

“And the city said, no. They said that because the stabilization fund is going to be exiting the stage — which was frankly one of the principal goals of the tripartite health committee.”

“Because the stabilization fund construct that had worked pretty well for 35 to 38 years was no longer working because of the inversion of how equalization did.”

“And so I’m working with Scheinman as the chair of the tripartite. He said that we had reverse incentives to try and keep the stabilization fund that was keeping us from doing the things that were better for everyone. So part of the goal of the last several years was to move away from the stabilization fund construct.

— Alan Klinger, MLC lawyer, speaking to MLC leaders on September 30, 2025. The same day the MLC voted to approve the new self-funded NYCPPO plan.

Let that sink in.

The Stabilization Fund—created in the mid-1980s to equalize healthcare costs across unions and protect benefits during economic downturns—was not merely allowed to weaken. According to Klinger, it became an obstacle that needed to be removed.

A Decision Made Without the Members?

Klinger explains that he was “working with Scheinman as the chair of the tripartite,” referring to neutral arbitrator Martin Scheinman, alongside City Office of Labor Relations (OLR).

The Healthcare Tripartite committee exists as part of the 2014 and 2018 healthcare agreements. It is primarily tasked as a labor-management board to advance the cost containing goals of the healthcare agreements.

Together, Klinger confesses, they concluded that the Fund—which had “worked pretty well for 35 to 38 years”—was no longer desirable because of how equalization now functioned.

But what’s missing from this account is just as important as what’s said.

There is no reference to a vote of the MLC delegates over this matter.

No reference to past member consultation. No admissions to misusing the fund beyond its intended purposes. No mention of past disclosures that dismantling the Stabilization Fund had become an explicit objective.

Instead, Klinger describes a top-down strategic shift, driven by what the committee believed was “better for everyone,” even as the consequences fell hardest on those with the least voice—retirees, widows, orphans, and vulnerable beneficiaries.

The 9/11 Widows and Orphans: Collateral Damage

Nowhere is this more devastating than in the defunding of the 9/11 Widows and Orphans benefit—a program historically supported through the Stabilization Fund.

When questioned about why those benefits could not be guaranteed beyond the third quarter, Klinger relayed the City’s position plainly:

“The city said no… because the stabilization fund is going to be exiting the stage.”

In other words: the benefit wasn’t cut because savings simply failed to materialize.

It wasn’t cut because the City lacked resources.

It was cut because the funding mechanism itself was being intentionally dismantled, after being misused.

This reframes the issue entirely.

“Cost Savings”—or Structural Elimination?

For years, members were told healthcare concessions had to be accepted to “generate savings” that would protect the system. But Klinger’s remarks seem to reveal a deeper, emerging truth: those savings were never meant to sustain the Stabilization Fund long-term.

In fact, he acknowledges that the committee believed the Fund created “reverse incentives” that prevented them from doing what they thought was “better for everyone.”

So which is it?

• If healthcare givebacks were about preserving stability, why was the very structure designed to provide that stability targeted for removal?

• If concessions were about shared sacrifice, why were the most morally unassailable benefits—those for 9/11 families—allowed to hang by a thread?

• Why then were NYC retirees forced to organize and crowd fund to litigate for over three years in order to fight the City’s and MLC’s inferior, predatory, cost saving Medicare Advantage plan?

• If equalization was an issue, why was the HIP rate suppressed or reduced in FY 2016 as a “cost savings” measure when it further drained the Stabilization Fund?

A Promise Deferred, Not Guaranteed

Klinger attempts to soften the blow by suggesting that if projected savings exceed estimates in the new NYCEPPO plan, the MLC could “come back to OLR” and try to restore funding later.

But this is not a safeguard.

It is a contingency.

A hope.

A political gamble.

And critically, it places the burden of restoration on future negotiations, with an unknown carousel of City officials, rather than embedding protections where they once existed—inside a dedicated fund created for exactly these moments.

The Bentkowski Hypocrisy: Defending the Fund in Court While Undermining It in Practice

The most striking hypocrisy emerges when Klinger’s statements are placed alongside his sworn legal position in the Bentkowski litigation — the city retiree-led lawsuit challenging the City’s and MLC’s attempt to impose mandatory enrollment into a Medicare Advantage plan.

In that case—still actively litigated through this year—Klinger filed an affirming amicus brief on behalf of the MLC, in support of the City.

In that filing, he forcefully defended the Stabilization Fund as a legitimate, essential, and jointly administered mechanism that supports our existing healthcare, PICA drug benefits, chemotherapy costs, and even a widows’ and orphans’ benefit—explicitly rejecting claims that the Fund was a “slush fund”. Furthering the claims that recent “cost savings” decisions were intended to save and replenish the fund.

Yet now, in his most recent MLC remarks, Klinger acknowledges that one of the Tripartite Committee’s principal goals over “the last several years” was to move away from that very same Stabilization Fund construct.

He cannot credibly maintain both positions at once. Either the Fund was a vital, lawful pillar of collectively bargained benefits deserving judicial protection—or it was an outdated structure leadership was quietly working to eliminate.

What Bentkowski reveals is not just inconsistency, but a troubling dual strategy: defend the Fund in judicial court to preserve bargaining leverage and weaponize its depletion in the court of public opinion to justify benefit reductions and higher out-of-pocket costs, while dismantling it behind closed doors without member approval.

The Core Question the MLC and Unions Must Answer

The issue is no longer technical. It is democratic.

Who authorized the decision to “move away” from the Stabilization Fund? When exactly was this decision made “several years ago”?

When were MLC leaders and delegates told this was a primary goal?

Why were union members asked to accept concessions without being told the Fund itself was being phased out?

Alan Klinger’s own words make one thing unmistakably clear: this was not an accident, a misunderstanding, or an unavoidable outcome.

It was a strategy.

And the people most affected were never given a seat at the table.

MLC union leaders, it’s time to speak up.

Mr. Mulgrew, where were you when this decision to move away from the Stabilization fund was first hatched? What did you know? And, when did you know it?

Mr. Klinger. Mr. Scheinman. These are our tax dollars. Our dues. Our funds. Our unions.

You three need to exit the stage. But not before being held accountable.

Open the books. Let’s see that audit.

The “Transparent, Fair” Tripartite Committee?

You decide.

Related articles:

Editor’s note: The audio provided above also contains some other unsettling details — including an arbitration case in which the City insists that PICA drugs, once paid for by the Stabilization Fund, be the obligation of the welfare funds once again. Klinger says if this path continues, it will be “crippling”. Also, there is an acknowledgement that hundreds of millions are somehow still owed to the City beyond the savings the NYCEPPO plan is projected to generate.

We will unpack all of this and more in a future post.

The Municipal Labor Committee’s (MLC) reaction to The City’s reporting on Comptroller Brad Lander’s audit of the NYC Health Care Stabilization Fund has been swift — and deeply troubling. Rather than engaging with the substance of the audit or explaining why the full report remains unpublished, MLC leadership circulated an internal memo framing The City article as a “breach of trust” and attacking the very act of scrutiny.

In their scathing letter to other MLC union leaders, they call the audit “false and biased” while oddly pinning it on the Comptroller’s staff and not Lander himself. They also admit to lobbying to “correct” the audit, or having it “deferred” for the next mayoral and comptroller administration to roll out.

As The City reported, in response to questions about the audit, MLC Vice-Chair and DC 37 union president, Henry Garrido, said the MLC leadership found the audit deeply flawed, calling it a “ a political stunt” and insisted that many of the claims in that report are simply incorrect. The article quotes Garrido charging that the Comptroller’s team failed to understand the Fund’s purpose and governance, asserting that the critique “demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding.” Yet, more than a week after initial reporting, the Comptroller’s office still has not released the full audit for members or the public to see.

Instead of addressing these serious fiscal and governance questions, MLC leaders focused on vilifying the messengers. Their circulated memo warns against “surreptitious” recordings and seems more intent on policing internal speech than answering why the audit hasn’t been published, why members were not briefed transparently, or how the MLC will protect retiree healthcare dollars facing unsustainable cost spikes.

For educators, city workers, and retirees across New York, the MLC’s response has only deepened frustration and skepticism. On social media and in union spaces, rank and file voices have connected the dots between this secrecy and the larger, long-simmering problems tied to the Health Care Stabilization Fund and the welfare reserves that support it.

As The Wire: Educators NYC has reported, the Fund was weaponized with threats that it would “dry up” under the current contribution structure, even as healthcare costs continue to rise for active workers and retirees alike. For those who rely on these benefits — whether they are still in classrooms, hospitals, or sanitation garages, or long retired — this is not an abstract budget debate. It is about access to care, out-of-pocket costs, financial security, and the erosion of trust in institutions meant to safeguard their health after a lifetime of public service.

Meanwhile, union members have been shut out entirely from accountability and transparency with the MLC and their welfare funds. No rank and file or retiree voices at the table. No unfettered, regular access to minutes of meetings. No itemized financials. No direct, meaningful communications to all vested in their activities.

The Heart of The Matter: The Purpose of the NYC Healthcare Stabilization Fund and Transparency

The heart of the conflict lies in whether the Health Care Stabilization Fund has been used for the purpose for which it was originally created—and that question sits squarely at the center of the Comptroller’s audit now being withheld from public view. The 1986 agreement establishing the Fund is unambiguous: it was created as a joint City–MLC trust to equalize healthcare costs, absorbing differences between negotiated insurance rates and protecting workers and retirees from sudden spikes tied to marginal cost increases. It was designed to stabilize benefits, not to subsidize unrelated fiscal priorities.

Over time, however, the Fund appears to have been repurposed—tapped to finance retroactive wage increases, plug City budget holes, used to seed or pad existing welfare funds, and increasingly weaponized as a warning device, with its “looming depletion” cited to justify healthcare givebacks imposed on city workers and retirees. What began as a negotiated shield against volatility has been transformed into a lever of pressure—and that transformation was a choice, written not by accident, but by those entrusted to safeguard the Fund’s original purpose.

Another big issue is whether decisions were made with union members consent and whether the Tri-Partite Committee established in 2014, consisting of MLC and UFT lawyer, Alan Klinger, arbitrator Martin Scheinman, and an Office of Labor representative made unilateral decisions without consulting or allowing for other members of the MLC to deliberate and vote on pressing matters.

More Transparency and Accountability is Needed

What is notably absent from the MLC memo is any reassurance that the Stabilization Fund has been managed properly, or that the Comptroller’s concerns are unfounded. There is no timeline for the audit’s release, no commitment to engage directly with rank-and-file members on these issues, and no acknowledgment of the interconnected welfare funds — including those tied to the UFT and DC 37 — that have also been subject to scrutiny and pressure. When union leadership treats external oversight as betrayal, it deepens the credibility gap between officials and the workers they represent.

This is more than a transparency issue; it goes to the heart of public trust. Workers and retirees have sacrificed, contributed, and built systems meant to protect their families’ wellbeing — only to be left in the dark about decisions that could reshape their health coverage and financial futures.

A Call to Action: Demand Transparency, Accountability, and Increased Oversight

This moment requires more than frustration — it requires coordinated action. Public money, worker benefits, and retiree healthcare are not private union secrets. They are public trusts that demand scrutiny, clarity, and accountability.

What You Can Do Today/This Week

Please take a moment to reach out to elected officials and oversight agencies to demand the release of the full audit and the start of appropriate oversight or investigation.

Suggested message to officials:

I am writing as a city worker, retiree, and taxpayer who depends on the integrity of New York City’s public-employee healthcare system. Recent reporting about the withheld audit of the Health Care Stabilization Fund raises serious concerns for active workers and retirees alike — especially as healthcare costs rise and benefits are reduced or restructured. This Fund exists to protect the healthcare of the people who keep this city running and those who have already given decades of service. Delaying or disputing an audit without making it public undermines trust and leaves workers and retirees in the dark about decisions that directly affect their care and financial security. I urge your office to ensure the immediate release of the full audit by the NYC Comptroller’s Office and to take whatever additional oversight or investigative steps are necessary to protect public funds, worker benefits, and municipal employee and retiree healthcare.

We suggest sharing the articles from The City and The Wire in your communications with officials.

You can use the sample message provided to contact:

• NYC Comptroller’s Office — demand immediate publication of the full audit.
  

• NYC Public Advocate — ask them to use their oversight powers to push for release, hearings, or inquiries.
  

• New York State Attorney General — request an independent investigation into the Fund and related welfare funds.
  

• New York State Comptroller — ask for coordination and oversight where state and city financial matters intersect.
  

• U.S. House Representatives & New York State legislators — insist on accountability and transparency for municipal workers and retirees.
  

• U.S. Department of Labor — raise concerns about the fiduciary management of joint city labor healthcare funds and need for transparency

• Mayor-Elect Zohran Mamdani and Comptroller-Elect Mark Levine —ask them to also call for the release of the existing Stabilization Fund audit without delay or changes

  ---

  It’s time for rank and file city workers and retirees to fight back and demand better.

  ---

  Related:

  ---

  Thanks for reading The Wire: Powered by Educators of NYC! This post is public so feel free to share it.

  Share

Sign up here to get the latest stories from THE CITY delivered to you each morning.

The office of City Comptroller Brad Lander is auditing a key fund that pays for city employee’s health benefits, THE CITY has learned, as public sector unions and the administration of Mayor Eric Adams remain locked in a dispute over who is responsible for replenishing the cash pot.

For years, the Health Insurance Stabilization Fund has been used to pay for some city workers’ health insurance premiums and supplemental benefits, like prescription drugs and dental and vision plans. The fund ran dry last year as a planned cost-saving switch of retiree health coverage to Medicare Advantage was tied up in the state’s courts. The fund is paid for by taxpayers and jointly managed by the city and the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC), a consortium of the city’s 102 public-sector unions.

The comptroller’s office is investigating the use of the stabilization fund to pay for supplemental benefits and more, MLC leaders told their members in a Dec. 16 meeting, according to audio obtained by THE CITY.

Alan Klinger, the group’s attorney, told the union leaders in attendance that the comptroller’s office has taken the position that “the stabilization fund is a strict trust that could only be used for equalization” of premium rates, an assertion he told the group both the MLC and the city dispute. Klinger explained that equalization is one of many uses that the fund was established to address: “There’s no trust indenture that formally restricts that it can only be used for equalization.”

Henry Garrido, a co-chair of the MLC and the head of the city’s largest public sector union, told MLC members that he believes that Lander’s probe is unprecedented and a “political stunt” from the erstwhile Democratic mayoral primary candidate and current Congressional challenger.

“For him to take that position is not only outrageous, but unprecedented,” railed Garrido, according to the audio recording. “No other comptroller has ever done that because, so far, since the inception of the stabilization fund, it’s been a function of the collective bargaining process.”

Spokespersons for City Hall and District Council 37, Garrido’s union, did not respond to requests for comment. Klinger did not respond to a message seeking comment.

It is unclear when or why the comptroller’s office began its audit of the stabilization fund. A spokesperson did not respond to THE CITY’s questions about the probe.

The stabilization fund was created to balance the difference in rates between the city’s two most popular premium-free health plans, GHI and HIP, a process known as equalization. The fund grew as the cost of GHI began to exceed the HIP rate, growing from $30 million at its inception in the mid-1980s to more than $500 million by 2011 — a tempting pot of cash for the city and the unions at a time of fiscal uncertainty and rising health costs.

By the end of the 2024 fiscal year, the fund had a reported “disposable balance” of just $1 million, the comptroller’s office reported in June. It estimated that covering the stabilization fund will cost taxpayers $612 million alone in the fiscal year that ended in July.

“So basically, you created this fund, it amassed a substantial balance, and the city and the labor unions figured out different ways to use those dollars that provided additional health benefits and provided additional fiscal resources to the city,” said Ana Champeny, a budget expert at the Citizens Budget Commission, a fiscally conservative watchdog group. “And this was all well and good up until the point when suddenly GHI cost more than HIP and they ran out of money, and there were no more deposits being made, and the balance got spent down.”

With the probe, Lander is inserting himself into a long-simmering conflict between the unions and the administration of Mayor Eric Adams that this spring exploded into public view over which side is responsible for billions of dollars in pledged health care savings that have failed to materialize.

In June, Adams abandoned the switch to move city retirees to Medicare Advantage, which was meant to help make up for the funding shortfall. An additional cost-saving measure to switch the city’s active workers to a self-insured plan is slated to go into effect on Jan. 1.

The MLC argued in a lawsuit it filed against the city that it is not responsible for making up the stabilization fund’s cash and sought to block efforts by the Adams administration to pursue arbitration.

Lander’s term as comptroller expires at the end of the year, which would leave incoming Comptroller-elect Mark Levine to pick up the probe unless Lander wraps up before Dec. 31. Garrido is the co-chair of Levine’s transition committee.

In response to a question from an MLC member during the Dec. 16 meeting, Garrido said that the audit is “not part of the discussions” on the transition. A representative for Levine’s transition team did not respond to a request for comment.

New York faces a $2.18 billion budget gap for the remainder of the fiscal year ending in July 2026, and a $10 billion deficit for the coming fiscal year, the Comptroller’s office announced Thursday.

Read the original The City article

Editor’s Note:

Articles published by THE CITY are free to republish under the Creative Commons Attribution license.

When Geoffrey Sorkin, Executive Director of the United Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund, gave sworn testimony before the New York City Council civil service and labor committee in 2021, his warning was unmistakable.

The money that supports City health benefits, he said, was “about to be depleted.” If that happened, it would be “catastrophic.”

He lied to us all, including City Council, when he said the Healthcare Stabilization Fund (HSF) is what funds all city healthcare benefits — but that’s not the rub.

The looming threat to the Stabilization Fund, Sorkin explained, justified the creation of the NYC Medicare Advantage Plus Plan—a plan he described as financially necessary, federally subsidized, and ultimately superior for retirees. From his perspective, the main difference was straightforward: more prior authorizations.

That testimony’s rationale has since been used to undergird some of the most consequential changes to educator and retiree health care in recent memory. But when the financial record is examined closely, a troubling disconnect emerges—one that raises serious questions about transparency, governance, and who is actually bearing the cost of these decisions.

The dutiful skeptic might go further in asking: Was this a manufactured crisis of the City’s and MLC’s making, while the unions raided the Stabilization fund for retro-wages and cashed in on bulk transfers for their own welfare funds, and the city’s Office of Labor Relation got its long-suspected wish of seeing the HSF dissolve? Conversely, convincing city workers and retirees that more sacrifices in the form of “cost saving” measures to their healthcare needed to be taken to “replenish” the ever-bleeding Stabilization Fund?

The Raiding of the Stabilization Fund

The New York City Healthcare Stabilization Fund was created as a financial backstop to protect the health benefits of municipal workers and retirees during periods of economic stress. Its stated purpose was straightforward: to absorb and offset rising healthcare costs, prevent sudden premium increases or benefit cuts, and ensure continuity of coverage for workers, retirees, and their families. Importantly, the fund also carried moral and legal obligations beyond routine labor costs, including payments tied to long-term liabilities such as healthcare and survivor benefits for 9/11 widows and orphans—families whose loved ones died in service to the city. In public statements and labor agreements, city and union leaders repeatedly described the Stabilization Fund as a safeguard that must be preserved to avoid catastrophic consequences if it were ever depleted — with healthcare being its purpose.

Yet over time, the Stabilization Fund was systematically circumvented and repurposed, not through an open public debate, but through a series of bulk transfers and cost-shifting maneuvers that drained the fund while preserving the appearance of fiscal stability. Hundreds of millions of dollars were removed to plug unrelated budget holes, finance a billion dollars in retroactive wage increases, and seed union-controlled welfare funds—often without meaningful transparency or city union member consent. As a related tangent, we must also keep in mind that some of the city union welfare funds are not only used for healthcare benefits.

At the same time, rank-and-file workers and retirees were told that benefit reductions, higher out-of-pocket costs, and drastic changes such as forced enrollment into Medicare Advantage were “necessary” to save a fund that had already been hollowed out.

The result was a paradox: a Stabilization Fund declared too depleted to meet its core obligations— including commitments to 9/11 survivors—while substantial sums earmarked for healthcare were moved and sat outside the fund, beyond public and member oversight, as members paid more and received less.

If this was not enough, now, the City and the MLC, along with Mulgrew, want to manage a self-funded healthcare plan for city workers after bankrupting the stabilization fund. And no one has yet to answer how PICA drugs will be covered without the Stabilization Fund — even as Express Scripts is owed millions of dollars.

Members Pay More—While the Welfare Fund Grows

For active educators and retirees, the lived reality is clear.

Ask anyone who has had to pay thousands of dollars out of pocket for dental care as the reimbursement schedule has remained virtually unchanged in years.

Out-of-pocket costs have increased. Dental, vision, and prescription benefits remain limited — with some minor upgrades happening during the UFT election season.

Retirees face new layers of bureaucracy, delayed care, and denials tied to prior-authorization requirements. In-service members quietly absorb higher copays and utilization controls that were once promised would be temporary.

These changes were framed as unavoidable—necessary sacrifices to prevent financial collapse.

Yet the UFT Welfare Fund is not funded by private capital or discretionary reserves. It is financed by taxpayer dollars contributed by the City of New York and by member-derived funds tied to negotiated benefits. The same is true about the monies transferred from the Stabilization Fund. That makes its stewardship a matter of public trust as well as union responsibility.

And the numbers tell a different story.

Over the past 10 years, the Welfare Fund’s assets have grown exponentially, surpassing $1 billion in the most recent filing. Each year, the fund took in more than it spent. Even in its last filing for tax year FY 23-24 —after slightly higher benefit payments and administrative costs—the fund ended the year with tens of millions of dollars added to its reserves.

This is not a fund on the verge of depletion, nor one affected by healthcare cost spikes. It is a fund accumulating wealth—while members are paying more and more out of pocket while unable to see behind the curtain or hold trustees accountable.

Administrative Costs Rise as Benefits Stand Nearly Still

At the same time members were being told there was no alternative to cost-shifting, internal spending moved sharply in another direction.

Administrative compensation increased dramatically in the most recent year, despite a reduction in staffing levels. An especially opaque category—we’ve labeled simply “other expenses”—nearly doubled in a single year, rising into the tens of millions of dollars.

These are precisely the categories where consulting fees, legal services, and internal cost-sharing arrangements often appear. Yet members have no access to detailed explanations. There are no public minutes describing why these costs rose, no itemized disclosures, and no opportunity for educators or retirees to evaluate whether these expenditures improved their benefits or merely expanded overhead.

In the last UFT Welfare Fund 990 filing, all of the following happened simultaneously:

• “Other expenses” jumped by ~$11.5M, nearly doubling from the year before

• Salaries jumped by ~$7.6M while staff was cut

• Investment income doubled

• Assets still increased by $70M+

• Members were still told more austerity was necessary

And yet there is no corresponding disclosure of related-party cash flows that appear anywhere obvious in the return.

It’s becoming more and more apparent that the real red flags appear in the “Other functional expenses” section of recent Welfare Fund filings. We looked at other expenses beyond compensation and benefits paid out (Section IX, sections 11-24e of 990 form).

We totaled these to be:

• 2021: $11.7M

• 2022: $12.4M

• 2023: $23.9M (nearly doubled in one year)

And while the amount spent on benefits usually were in alignment to healthcare inflation, it is most definitely not proportional to the monies that have grown in the fund.

Benefits paid to members are barely keeping up with inflation in the healthcare industry even in the last couple of years:

• FY 2022-23: $324.5M

• FY 2023-24: $356.1M (+9.7%)

This slightly modest increase, however, lags far behind:

• growth in assets

• growth in investment income

• growth in administrative spending

The bottom line is that members are seeing slight benefit increases that attempt to keep up with inflation while the fund’s balance sheet and overhead balloon.

It is important to note that the amount of benefits paid to members dipped in 2017 and 2018 from the previous years even as assets began to stockpile from the stabilization fund transfers in the last decade, special provisions in the UFT labor contracts and $50 million per year from the City for paid parental leave, beginning in 2018.

Decisions Without Representation or Records

The structure of the Welfare Fund’s governance only deepens concern.

There are no independent in-service trustees on the Welfare Fund board — it is overwhelmingly comprised of UFT officers.

There is no rank-and-file representation.

Retirees—whose health coverage has been most affected by Medicare Advantage and prior authorization—have no formal voice. Meetings are closed. Minutes are not published. Votes are not made public. Essentially, this is the non-transparent governance approach held by the city unions in the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC).

Major decisions affecting health care for hundreds of thousands of people have been made behind closed doors, justified after the fact by warnings of financial catastrophe.

Members were misled by the union leadership, MLC and City about the financial necessity of cost saving changes in the 2014 and 2018 healthcare agreements to replenish the Stabilization Fund, and the nature of the funds involved—claims that have not been publicly answered with transparent accounting.

Prior Authorization as Policy, Not Necessity

In his testimony, Sorkin downplayed prior authorization, describing it as a routine feature of modern health insurance. But for educators and retirees, prior authorization is not an abstract concept. It is a delayed procedure. A denied referral. A medication held up while paperwork circulates.

These mechanisms are not neutral. They are cost-containment tools designed to reduce utilization by shifting time, risk, and stress onto patients.

The contradiction is striking: access to care is being restricted in the name of savings at the very moment more than a billion dollars in taxpayer-funded and member-derived assets sit idle.

A Growing Credibility Gap

Educators are not demanding extravagance. They are demanding honesty and transparency.

If benefits must be constrained, members deserve a clear explanation grounded in transparent financial facts. If reserves must grow, members deserve to know why—and for whose benefit. If administrative costs rise sharply, those decisions require public justification.

What members have received instead is a steady narrative of scarcity, paired with policies that increase their personal costs, even as the Welfare Fund’s balance sheet reaches historic highs. While members fall prey to vitriolic, vengeful attacks by leadership on all those who ask tough questions within the union’s circles.

Time for More Independent Oversight

This is no longer an internal union matter. The UFT Welfare Fund manages vast sums of taxpayer money and negotiated member benefits, and its decisions affect educators, retirees, and their families across New York City.

That is why independent scrutiny is now essential.

For one, there are no rank and file trustees on the Welfare Fund board. Compare that with the retirees that sit on the UFT’s SHIP board. The present Welfare Fund board shares little to nothing about proceedings, minutes or itemized financials. For a fund this large in assets, this is unconscionable.

State and federal oversight agencies should examine the fund’s finances, governance practices, and related-party arrangements—not to prejudge wrongdoing, but to restore trust through transparency.

Those tasked with defending the status quo will say the New York City Comptroller audits the city union Welfare Funds. This is true.

Yet, ask them when was the last time. Have they read the audits and financials? Where can members access these audits and financials on the UFT portal? Do they know what they include and don’t include? And, do these audits and/or financials show an itemized account of benefits managed by the UFT Welfare Fund?

How are internal costs being allocated, and who sets the rules? The costs seem to fluctuate disproportionately and disparately for certain items expensed from year to year.

Moreover, when were UFT members told that the Welfare Fund had already contracted United Healthcare/United Medical Resources as a third-party benefits administrator, years ago? According to the filings, the UFT forged a working partnership with UMR since around 2020, even before the upcoming premium-free healthcare plan (NYCEPPO) switch by the City and MLC (see Independent Contractors line of the 990s, 2020-24).

Is it safe to say that Sorkin and Mulgrew have had a working relationship with United Healthcare since 2020? Does this relationship partially explain why administrative costs have skyrocketed? Does it help explain how so many city workers, retirees and their dependents will land with United Healthcare and its preauthorization machine in 2026?

The truth is, New York City Comptroller, Brad Lander, has dragged his feet in releasing a much-awaited audit of the now bankrupted New York City Stabilization Fund even as he’s in his final days in the office. Lander appears to be conflicted as he openly solicits union endorsements for the various offices he’s sought to run for as a candidate in the last few months — including mayor and now, Congress.

This needs a fresh set of eyes. Because when educators are paying more to get less in the midst of an “affordability crisis”, while being told the cupboard is bare, the public deserves to know:

Where did our money really go in OUR FUND?

It’s high time we find out.

We call on New York City Council, the New York State Attorney General and State Comptroller, and related federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor, to start digging into this matter and other related issues.

This call to action may also need to include petitioning some oversight from the Congressional House Committee on Education and Workforce that is presently “seeking input from stakeholders to inform Congress how it can reform the LMRDA to ensure labor organizations adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct.”

Our dues. Our fund. Our union.

So, open the damn books.

Access the UFT Welfare Fund filings here

Editor’s Postscript:

There are many more questions and revelations that have surfaced since we started this deep dive into the Welfare Fund finances.

We will unpack them in the coming days. Others related issues have arisen.

These also include:

1. How DC 37’s Welfare Fund spent its money from its share of the NYC Stabilization Fund in the last few years — with hundreds of millions in remodeling costs of its union building, according to its 990 filings over the last 4 years. Before 2014, the DC 37 Benefits Fund was once bleeding money, and reportedly on the verge of collapse, until the infusion of millions in cash from the Stabilization Fund, especially after 2018. In a complete 180, it also sits perched on nearly 900 million dollars in assets.

   Meanwhile, their Welfare Benefits Fund has contracted Hunter Roberts Construction for millions in the last few years for demolition and remodeling of the union building owned by DC 37. They paid over $102 million alone to this company according to its last filing. This decision to hire them was made not too shortly after Hunter Roberts agreed to pay over 7 million in penalties and restitution for engaging in a fraudulent overbilling scheme.

   ---

2. A Strong Economy for All Coalition is a New York–based 501(c)(4) “issue advocacy” nonprofit that publicly presents itself as a labor- and community-aligned policy organization. Media coverage has identified Michael Kink as its executive director in connection with state policy campaigns. Kink is also listed on the UFT payroll as a supervisor, earning over $200,000 annually. While the UFT’s Chief Financial Officer, David Hickey serves at the coalition’s treasurer. Charles Khan, the coalition deputy director, is listed as holding a clerical position on the UFT filings and is still listed as making $118,000 a year.

   As a social-welfare organization, the coalition can engage in significant advocacy and lobbying and—unlike a charity—does not have to disclose its donors. It is routinely described in press accounts as union-aligned and linked to public-employee unions, including New York City’s teacher-union ecosystem.

   Federal labor filings list “A STRONG ECONOMY FOR ALL” at 52 Broadway, 11th Floor, the same address used in its IRS filings and owned by the UFT. That overlap reinforces the perception that the coalition operates squarely within the UFT orbit as its own lobbying front, despite the fact that most UFT members would likely report having never heard of the organization or its work.

   The most serious questions arise from its recent IRS filings. In its 2022 Form 990, the coalition reported a sharp revenue increase to roughly $845,000, alongside a surge in liabilities to $960,112 and “other expenses” totaling $1.19 million. In its 2023 Form 990-EZ, cash and investments fell from $995,878 to $91,470, while liabilities dropped from $960,112 to $0—a swing of nearly $1 million with no clear public explanation.

   What was this $960,000 liability—a loan, a payable, or a pass-through obligation? Who was it owed to, and how was it extinguished while nearly the same amount of cash disappeared? And what, if anything, has been disclosed to union members about a lobbying organization carrying—and then erasing—a nearly million-dollar obligation reportedly due to the union?

   

Also see:

Almonte's Newsletter

The UFT Welfare Fund Widens Gap Between Investments and Benefits Paid—Again

In New York City, dental care and prescription coverage for public school educators are managed by our union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), through its Welfare Fund. In April, I argued here and at a UFT Executive Board meeting that union members are struggling with dental costs, that the Welfare Fund can afford to improve its coverage, and th…

Read more

2 years ago · 24 likes · 5 comments · Ronnie Almonte

Almonte's Newsletter

The UFT Welfare Fund is Prioritizing Investments over Dental Benefits

Over the years I’ve been dropped by several dentists. I receive a letter stating that the provider no longer takes the UFT Welfare Fund because it pays them too little. Last year I received such a letter from my current dentist, who I still see but at a cost of $90 instead of the $15 I paid when they took UFT. It seems like I’m not alone—many of my coll…

Read more

2 years ago · 25 likes · 5 comments · Ronnie Almonte